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Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical
Developments
Paul L. Murphy*
I deplore... the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed,
and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who
write for them .... These ordures are rapidly depraving the public
taste....
It is however an evil for which there is no remedy. Our liberty de-
pends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without
being lost. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In their brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court attacking
that body's earlier validation 2 of the state's newspaper "Gag
Law' 3 and the use of an injunction to silence a publication, the
* Professor of History and American Studies, University of Minnesota.
1. Letters from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. W. Jones (Jan. 2, 1814) and Dr. J.
Currie (Jan. 28, 1786), reprinted in T. JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 150-51 (S. Pado-
ver ed. 1939).
2. State ex reL Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770 (1928). The
Hennepin County attorney brought an action under the act to enjoin and abate
as a nuisance The Saturday Press. Defendants demurred to the complaint on
the grounds that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
and that the statute was unconstitutional. The district court overruled the de-
murrer and certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which af-
firmed the order overruling the demurrer and held the statute to be a valid
police regulation. Id. The district court then addressed the merits and found
the newspaper to be a public nuisance. Defendant again appealed unsuccess-
fully. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 179 Minn. 40, 228 N.W. 326 (1929), rev'd sub
nom. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
3. Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, 1925 MwN. LAws 358 (held unconstitutional
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)). The law provided in relevant part:
Any person ... engaged in the business of regularly or customa-
rily producing, publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling
or giving away
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical, or
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine
or other periodical,
is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be
enjoined, as hereinafter provided.
In actions brought under (b) above, there shall be available the de-
fense that the truth was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends ....
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attorneys for the Chicago Daily Tribune4 set forth an extensive
historical exposition of freedom of the press. 5 The brief con-
tended that from the death of Socrates through the fall of the
Roman Empire until after the Renaissance, authorities prohib-
ited discussion and proscribed scientific works. During this pe-
riod, the Inquisition flourished, and censorship was in the
hands of church and state. The brief pointed out that the
Tudor and Stuart dynasties censored the English press, and
that during the Commonwealth, until the latter years of the
17th century, the government frequently used the hated licens-
ing technique against the press. Western civilization, it con-
tended, then came to see the error of suppressing ideas. If
governments, particularly corrupt ones, could silence written
opposition to their actions, they could speedily crush all at-
tempts to reform existing evils.6 Characterizing the Minnesota
law as "despotic", 7 the brief argued that "such laws give birth
to violence and revolution; when the people are forbidden to
speak and write, they begin to act." "Surely," its authors ar-
gued, "it is better to permit the free publication of defamation
with responsibility therefor afterwards. 'No abuse of a free
press can be so great as the evils of its suppression.' "8 The
brief ended with the plea, "[w] e therefore ask this Court to vin-
dicate the freedom of the press and to protect a right for which
so much blood has been shed down through the centuries."9
The Minnesota Supreme Court, which considered the case
two years earlier,'0 remained unimpressed. It rejected both the
pleas based on history and the strong arguments regarding the
limits of state governmental authority" and followed its earlier
4. Following the Minnesota Supreme Court ruling in State ex rel Olson v.
Guilford, 179 Minn. 40, 228 N.W. 326 (1929), rev'd sub nom. Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931). Colonel Robert R. McCormick, owner of the Chicago Daily
Tribune, and chairman of the Free Press Committee of the American Newspa-
per Publishers' Association, retained counsel to assist those engaged by The
Saturday Press, the Minneapolis newspaper which sparked the controversy, in
overturning the 'tyrannical" statute. Foster, The 1931 Personal Liberties Cases,
9 N.Y.UJ..Q. REv. 64, 68 & n.16 (1931).
5. Brief for Appellant at 40-58, State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 179 Minn.
40, 228 N.W. 326 (1929).
6. Id. at 45-57, 94-98.
7. Id. at 376.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 376-77.
10. See note 2 supra.
11. Brief for Appellant at 217-23, State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 179 Minn.
40, 228 N.W. 326 (1929).
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decision.12 In that opinion, Chief Justice Samuel B. Wilson
noted the deference accorded to the legislature in promoting
the public welfare.'3 More specifically, the Chief Justice found
that a court may enjoin a newspaper as a public nuisance when
existing libel laws did not adequately protect the public.14
The case of Near v. Minnesota'5 resulted from the defend-
ant's appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's decision. Contemporaries saw Near as
a landmark,16 with one legal commentator on freedom of the
press characterizing the case as "the most important decision
rendered since the adoption of the first amendment." 7 Subse-
quent authorities continue to view it in a similar light.18 The
opinion represents an important development in American
public law; it had important impacts upon a wide range of his-
torical developments. These include the relationship between
government and the broad dispersal of public information; the
general history of public regulation in the United States; the
use of law in America to criminalize certain forms of behavior,
and the subsequent forms of social control which emerged from
that process; the development of the fourteenth amendment as
an instrument for the proper definition of state authority and
state responsibility within the federal system; and the changed
role of law vis-a-vis the media as the United States underwent
the modernization process, including all of the implications
which that process produced for the operation of democratic in-
stitutions within a mass, impersonal society.
This article will examine the historical importance of Near
v. Minnesota and its place in this broad range of historical
trends. While not attempting counter-factual analysis, it will
speculate briefly upon what might have happened if one of the
Justices had joined the minority19 to reinforce the series of his-
12. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 179 Minn. 40, 42, 228 N.W. 326, 326 (1929),
rev'd sub nom. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
13. State ex tel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 460, 219 N.W. 770, 771
(1928).
14. Id. at 461-62, 219 N.W. at 772.
15. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
16. Several law reviews commented on Near. See, e.g., 31 COLUM. I REv.
1148 (1931); 30 MICH. L. REv. 279 (1931); 16 MINN. I REV. 97 (1931); 80 U. PA. I
REV. 130 (1931); 41 YALE LJ. 262 (1931).
17. Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MICH. I. REV. 703,
749 (1938).
18. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1976);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
19. Chief Justice Hughes wrote the opinion for the majority, in which Jus-
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torical developments which Near so dramatically interrupted.
It contends that Near was a desirable break with a number of
past trends and, as such, generally deserves the landmark
designation it has gained.
I. THE HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS
The proper relationship between government and the press
began to develop during the period of the English Civil War in
the early 17th century. The invention of the printing press in
the 15th century and its rapid development in the 16th and 17th
centuries opened vast possibilities for the communication of
ideas in all fields. Prevailing doctrines of spiritual and tempo-
ral sovereignty made it inevitable that control over the new me-
dium of expression would be gathered firmly in the hands of
the ruling authorities.2 0 In England, printing first developed
under royal sponsorship and soon became a monopoly granted
by the crown. The crown retained, however, the right to re-
strain in advance the printing of material considered threaten-
ing or unwarranted. The government initially used its
authority against certain religious works "with divers heresies
and erroneous opinions." 2 1 But once the crown began the pro-
cess of censorship by curtailing one segment of the press, the
whole field became open to official suppression. In 1566 the
Star Chamber22 issued a decree limiting printers to publication
of only the most innocuous sort of material, a role it enforced
with increasing severity under the early Stuart rulers of the
17th century.23 To this the authorities added over the years fur-
ther royal proclamations, Star Chamber decrees,24 and parlia-
tices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts joined. Butler dissented and was
joined by Van DeVanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland.
20. Pope Alexander VI proclaimed in a 1501 bull that unlicensed printing
should be prohibited so that publicity would not be given to evil. 0. FuERARA,
Tim BORGiA POPE: ALEXANDER THE SIX= 310 (1940).
21. SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 387 (C. Stephenson & F.
Marcham eds. 1937). See also F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND
48 (1965).
22. The Star Chamber was the judicial body that heard most of the cases
involving the press. It was under the authority of the Privy Council, which as-
sisted the King in administering the laws. F. SIEBERT, supra note 21, at 28-29.
23. C. SCOFIELD, A STUDY OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER 32 (1900). The
decree prohibited the printing of books advocating positions contrary to any or-
dinance in effect. For the text of the decree see J. TANNER, TUDOR CONsTrru-
TIONAL DOCUMENTS 245-47 (1930).
24. The most famous of these was the decree of 1586. See F. SIEBERT,
supra note 21, at 61-62. The decree limited the number of printers, gave vast
powers of search and seizure to the government backed printing monopoly, and
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mentary enactments, constantly increasing in complexity and
further shackling the art and the business of publication.
Liberal opposition to the crown arose early. Although op-
ponents of these practices did not question the propriety of
punishing seditious libels, they did object to "prior punish-
ment." The licensing power allowed authorities to place a prior
restraint on a publication's issuance; anything published with-
out a license was criminal. These views continued into the civil
war period. When Parliament assumed control over printing
and some Puritan leaders demanded that the process be
strictly regulated along prior lines, strong objection arose.
Other Parliamentary leaders, convinced that there was a "defi-
nite, discernable, and discoverable truth in religious doctrine,
the presentation of which could not fail to convince the unbe-
liever,"25 began talking in limited "marketplace" vocabulary.
As the poet John Milton wrote at the time:
And though all the winds of doctrin were let loose to play upon the
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falshood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encounter?
2 6
Milton was also a pragmatist when it came to the process of li-
censing. Stunned by threats against his unlicensed pamphlet
discussing the desirability of divorce, Milton pointed out that
the licensing system depended upon the skill and commitment
of the official charged with its enforcement. If the censor
be of such worth as behoovs him, there cannot be a more tedious and
unpleasing journey-work, a greater losse of time levied upon his head,
then to be made the perpetuall reader of unchosen books and pam-
phlets .... [W]e may easily foresee what kind of licencers we are to
expect hereafter, either ignorant, imperious, and remisse, or basely pe-
cuniary.2 7
At the same time his friend Samuel Hartlib offered the alterna-
tive scenario: "the art of Printing will so spread knowledge that
the common people, knowing their own rights and liberties will
not be governed by way of oppression ... -"28 Thus, the im-
portance of the press's effect on the relationship between the
government and the people was recognized early.
required the licensing of all books. The text is set out in J. TANNER, Supra note
23, at 279-84.
25. F. SIEBERT, supra note 21, at 191. See generally W. H R, TRAcTS ON
LIBERTY IN THE PtRrrAN REVOLUTION (1934).
26. J. MILTON, AREOPAGrriCA, in 4 J. MILTON, THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON
347 (F. Patterson ed. 1931) (hereinafter cited as J. MILTON).
27. Id. at 322-23.
28. Hartlib, A Description of the Famous Kingdom of Macaria (October 25,
1641), quoted in F. SIEBERT, supra note 21, at 192.
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But Puritans, including Milton, quickly saw that "'truth' is
not always victorious even where given a free field,"29 and that
"wrong" opinion must be suppressed when the press is prop-
erly controlled. Hence, although Milton's Areopagitica stands
as a literary classic, a monument to intellectual freedom, and
an invaluable contribution to political thinking on the subject
of liberty, it left much to be desired as a statement on the prin-
ciples of freedom of the press. "Milton wanted freedom of dis-
cussion for serious-minded men who held honest, although
differing, opinions. He was not willing to extend this same free-
dom to men of lesser standing with less serious purposes."3 0
Hence, it is not surprising to see him later becoming a censor
and, while continuing to advocate a system of unlicensed print-
ing, endorsing the sanctions of the criminal law for any abuse
or licentiousness by the press. '"Those [unlicensed words], if
they be found mischievous and libellous, the fire and execu-
tioner will be the timeliest and the most effectuall remedy, that
mans [sic] prevention can use."3 1
Many of Milton's contemporaries, thought of today as liber-
als, shared his views. Roger Williams, although an eloquent
pleader for toleration, carefully added, "I speak not of scandals
against the civil state, which the civil magistrate ought to pun-
ish."32 John Locke argued that "no opinions contrary to human
society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the
preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magis-
trate."33 He proposed the punishment of persons who "will not
own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere
religion."34 Sedition was to be punished, and the intolerant
29. F. SIEBERT, supra note 21, at 191.
30. Id. at 197. See W. CLYDE, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS 172-73, 261 (1934).
31. J. MILTON, supra note 26, at 353.
32. Williams, The Bloody Tenant (1644), reprinted in 3 THE WRTiNGS OF
ROGER WILLIAMS 136 (S. Caldwell ed. 1866).
33. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), reprinted in 35 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 17 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
34. Id. at 18. Locke's philosophy of when toleration should be extended to
the intolerant took concrete form particularly in the McCarthy era. Proponents
of such toleration argued that democratic rights should not be denied to groups
repudiating democratic principles. See Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 431-35 (1941); W. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 91-94
(1958); A. MEULOHN, POLTCAL FREEDOM 42-43, 57, 76-77 (1960); Riesman,
Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 Pus. PoucY 52-58 (1942). See also
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 429, 439 (1950) (Jack-
son, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The minority view is clearly
stated in Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-
Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CH. L. REV. 173 (1956). See generally W.
BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957); G. Catlin, On Free-
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opinions of athiests and the exclusivist political implications of
Catholic doctrine were among the most seditious expression.
For Locke, however, the proper form of punishment was
not prior government censorship.35 By then the prior restraint
system was cumbersome and unpopular. When the English li-
censing laws expired in 1695, they were not extended.36 There-
after, freedom of the press from licensing came to be
recognized in England as a common law or natural right. That
law was summarized by Blackstone, in a now famous passage:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraint upon publication, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the
press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he
must take the consequence of his own temerity.3 7
Thus the governmental method for controlling the press
evolved from the prior censorship of Milton's day to the subse-
quent punishment of Blackstone's.
Eighteenth century liberals, less secular and more political,
viewed freedom of the press in far more modern terms. As
Clinton Rossiter argued, "Cato's Letters rather than Locke's
Civil Government was the most popular, quotable, esteemed
source of political ideas in the colonial period."38 And clearly
the most famous of the Letters were those on freedom of
speech and his Reflections upon Libelling ,39 one of three essays
on libel law and freedom of the press. It was Cato from whom
the founding fathers derived certain of their first amendment
ideas, and it was Cato who redefined the proper relationship
doam, reprinted in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY 49 (M. Konvitz & C. Rossiter eds. 1958);
B. LIPPINCOTr, DEMORACY'S DLEmmA: THE TOTALTARIAN PARTY IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY (1965); K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1950).
35. Locke objected to the system because it injured the printing trade, was
administratively cumbersome, and was unnecessary because the common law
gave adequate protection against licentiousness. In 1694, he drafted for the
House of Commons a statement of eighteen reasons for terminating govern-
ment censorship. See P. KING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN LOcKE 202-09
(1858).
36.. See F. SIEBERT, supra note 21, at 260-3.
37. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 (emphasis in original).
38. C. RossrrE, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 141 (1953). "Cato" was the
joint pseudonym of the Whig political journalists, John Trenchard and Thomas
Gordon, whose essays were first published in the London press in 1720. The
essays were later collected in four volumes and sold widely in the years follow-
ing 1733. For a modern collection see D. JACOBSON, THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN
HERITAGE (1965).
39. D. JACOBSON, supra note 38, at 73-80 (letter of June 10, 1721).
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between government and the press, thereby affording a basis
for the evolution of a free press in America.
In Cato's view, freedom from illegitimate authority is vital,
and freedom of expression was a primary value. These free-
doms should be broad and should be limited only when their
use might directly hurt or control the right of another. But cen-
tral to our purposes was his description of the proper relation-
ship between the government and free press. Here he argued
that free government and free expression would prosper or die
togetherA0 Because government officials are agents of the peo-
ple's interests, they should be subject to popular criticism and
should, in fact, welcome having their activities openly ex-
amined. "Only the wicked Governors of Men dread what is
said of them,"41 Cato argued, and it is only they who fear a free
press. The proper method for limiting the press was to pres-
sure that entity to correct its errors, not to punish for them
when they occurred. In Cato's view, libels rarely provoked
causeless discontent against the government. In a statement
reminiscent of Justice Brennan's opinion in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,42 Cato argued that libels were the inevitable re-
sult of a free press, "an Evil arising out of a much greater
Good,"43 bringing advantages to society that far outweigh po-
tential harm. Cato was aware, however, of his own need for
protection at a time in England when his views were decidedly
premature. Thus, he was quick to point out that libels against
the government should be punishable,44 while truth about pub-
lic men and public measures should be admitted as a defense
against a criminal libel charge.45
Cato's Letters, as Leonard Levy argued, "was the high
water mark of libertarian theory until the close of the eight-
eenth century .... In fact, American libertarian theory,
neither original nor independent, was at its best little more
than an imitation of Cato."46 Just as Cato's ideas were not em-
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id. at 39.
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Justice Bren-
nan stated: "[T]here is a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270.
43. D. JACOBSON, supra note 38, at 78.
44. Id. at 238, 239.
45. Id. at 74.
46. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON XXVi
(1966).
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braced in practice in the England of those years,47 neither were
they embraced in practice on this side of the ocean before the
days of the infamous Alien and Sedition Laws.4 8 Certain por-
tions of his argument, such as the positive correlation between
free expression and good government, however, were accepted.
In fact, as the American revolutionary crisis intensified and re-
pression grew, the need to expose and protest against that re-
pression intensified as well. Evidence clearly shows that the
press became a powerful force in rallying colonial opposition
against British oppression.49
An example of the important impacts of Cato's influence on
later American history occurred during the Revolution itself.
Well before the Declaration of Independence, the members of
the Continental Congress addressed a statement to the inhabit-
ants of Quebec in an attempt to persuade them to support
American independence. Americans boasted of freedom of the
press as one of the essential blessings of liberty, which, "in its
diffusion of liberal sentiments," created conditions "whereby
oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honor-
able and just modes of conducting affairs."5 0 While such a
statement clearly was motivated by American self-interest, its
emphasis upon liberty's place above authority, and the impor-
tance of the people holding their governors accountable for the
protection of that liberty, represented an important new assur-
ance that the people's political power was and should be grow-
ing.
The first formal inclusion of freedom of the press in an
47. At common law truth was not a defense to a criminal libel charge. In
civil actions, however, truth was a defense for either libel or slander. See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 113-16, at 769-99 (4th ed. 1971).
48. Benjamin Franklin voiced the view of a number of Americans at the
time regarding "excess" freedom of the press, stating: "[F]ew of us, I believe,
have distinct ideas of its Nature and Extent.... [I]f it means the Liberty of
affronting, calumniating, and defaming one another, I, for my part, own myself
willing to part with my Share of it when our Legislators shall please so to alter
the Law, and shall cheerfully consent to exchange my Liberty of Abusing
others for the Privilege of not being abused myself." Franklin, An Account of
the Supremest Court of Judicature in Pennsylvania, viz. The Court of the Press,
Federal Gazette, Sept. 12, 1789, reprinted in 10 WRIrmGs OF BENJAMIN FRANLIN
37-38 (A. Smythe, ed. 1907) (emphasis in original).
49. See P. DAVISON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 225-45
(1941); A. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE 45-47, 280, 284-87 (1958); es-
says collected in THE PRESS AND THE AMERiCAN REVOLUTION (B. Bailyn & J.
Hench eds. 1980).
50. Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, Oct. 1774, reprinted
in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTA I CONGRESS 108 (W. Ford ed. 1904). Leonard
Levy, however, pointed out: "Illiberal--that is, loyalist-sentiments were sim-
ply suppressed during the Revolution." L, LEvy, supra note 46, at xlviii.
1981]
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American document came in section 12 of the Virginia Bill of
Rights of 1776, wherein the drafters acclaimed freedom of the
press as "one of the great bulwarks of liberty, [which] can
never be restrained but by despotic governments."5 Four
years later, in a draft of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, John Adams also emphasized: "The liberty of the press
is essential to the security of freedom in a state[;] it ought not,
therefore, to be restrained in this conmonwealth [sic ]."52 Simi-
lar language appeared in a number of other state bills of
rights. 53 In light of this attention to freedom of the press, the
failure to define the proper relationship between government
and the press in either the Articles of Confederation or the
Constitution seems contradictory. In neither of these docu-
ments nor, for that matter, in any of the various state constitu-
tions, did early Americans attempt to move beyond Blackstone
to spell out more precisely the law and theory of freedom of ex-
pression.
Some early Americans took pertinent actions, however,
which reflected a concern for developing a practical system to
deal concretely with free expression.54 When the State of
Pennsylvania successfully prosecuted Eleazer Oswald, a Phila-
delphia printer, for libel, despite his plea that the action was
simply an attempt by his enemies to attack him under the pre-
text of justice and to assault the rights of the press, 55 he did
generate some minority support for his position. In fact, some
of his supporters in the legislature pushed his attempt to im-
peach justices of the state supreme court who convicted him.56
Although the legislators were unsuccessful, their actions pro-
duced considerable public debate regarding the permissible
limits of a free press and the precise meaning of the free press
51. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAws 3814 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). The Virginia Bill of Rights, the
model for other states and the Federal Bill of Rights, did condemn general war-
rants previously issued for the seizure of seditious publications; thus, it
"greatly strengthened the freedom of the press." SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES
306 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1952) (hereinafter cited as PERRY & COOPER).
52. PERRY & COOPER, supra note 51, at 376.
53. Id. at 330, 340, 350, 356, 385. See also W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 156-58 (1980).
54. Advanced libertarians sought to move toward the acceptance of the
rule from the 1735 Zenger case, whereby truth was a defense in a criminal pros-
ecution for libel, with criminality to be determined by a jury of one's peers,
rather than a judge. But American acquiescence in the common law definition
of a free press was so widespread that the Zenger principles had remote
chance for acceptance. L LEVY, supra note 46, at li.
55. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 319-20 (Pa. 1788).
56. Id. at 329 n.b.
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clause in Pennsylvania's Bill of Rights. The Oswald ruling
made other state courts sensitive to violations of civil rights
and led to a number of positive rulings underwriting them. 7
On the other hand, when Thomas Jefferson proposed a new
constitution for Virginia in 1783, he wanted the press exempted
from prior restraints, but liable to punishment for false publica-
tions.58 Other state legislatures passed libel and sedition laws
which, while acknowledging the principle of no prior restraint,
clearly indicated the nature of expression that legitimately
could result in subsequent punishment.
When the Constitutional Convention met in May of 1787,
the free press issue obviously was low on the agenda. It was
not until August 20, near the end of that famous meeting, that
Charles Pinckney submitted a proposal for a bill of rights. The
press provision was among its thirteen propositions and simply
stated: "The liberty of the Press shall be inviolably pre-
served."5 9 Even this language had little appeal to the other
founding fathers, many of whom did not want a bill of rights,
because "[t]hey believed that provisions to safeguard individ-
ual liberties were originally created to protect the subject from
rulers claiming absolute powers and that such provisions had
no place in a constitution founded on the will of the people
themselves." 60 Other similar attempts to obtain at least certain
basic principles of liberty, such as liberty of the press and trial
by jury failed to win in a vote.61
57. See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart) 42 (1787); McMullen v. City
Council of Charleston, 1 S.C.L (1 Bay) 46 (1787); Porter v. Dunn, 1 S.C.L. (1
Bay) 53 (1787); Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213-15 (Conn. 1787); Gilbert v. Marcy, 1
Kirby 401-02 (Conn. 1787).
58. 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 304 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
59. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 340-42 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
(hereinafter cited as RECORDS).
60. PERRY & COOPER, supra note 51, at 404.
61. Id. at 405. George Mason, who opposed ratification, prepared a detailed
criticism of the final document. His primary objection was that "no declaration
of any kind, preserving the liberty of the press" was included. RECORDS, supra
note 59, at 640. Richard Henry Lee developed a set of proposals which he
sought to add to the document before Congress transmitted it to the state con-
ventions. These included freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and the
right to trial by jury in both criminal and civil cases. 3 THE LETrERS OF RICH-
ARD HENRY LEE 424 (J. Ballagh ed. 1911); 8 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS 648-49 (E. Burnett ed. 1930). A German analyst of American
constitutions, Willi Paul Adams, observes in his recent book that "[t] he use of
a bill of rights to curtail the power of the sovereign majority was a new step in
the development of Western constitutionalism." W. ADAMs, supra note 53, at
145. Noting that bills of rights always imposed limits on rulers, Adams points
out that "with independence the enemy disappeared, and the question arose
whether there still was any need for this kind of safeguard against arbitrary
power." Id.
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When the Constitution was submitted to the states for rati-
fication, citizens voiced protests of varying degrees about the
absence of a bill of rights. The Constitution's advocates thus
were prompted to respond. Alexander Hamilton in the Federal-
ist papers expressed a practical view. He argued that there
was no way to secure a concept such as freedom of the press
by words. "[WIhatever fine declarations may be inserted in
any constitution respecting it," he insisted, the protection of
free speech and a free press, like all our rights, "must alto-
gether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of
the people and of the government." 62 James Madison followed
a similar path. He agreed that those rights which were solely
dependent upon majority public opinion could be snuffed out
whenever that opinion changed.6 3 He went on to argue,
In Virginia, I have seen the bill of rights violated in every instance
where it has been opposed to a popular current.... Wherever the
real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In
our Governments, the real power lies in the majority of the Commu-
nity, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended not
from acts of Government, contrary to the sense of its constituents, but
from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the ma-
jor number of the Constituents.64
This was not, however, cause for inaction. In fact, Madison be-
lieved that when it came to the rights and liberties of individual
dissenters, a democratic majority could be as repressive as a
king. Thus, the majority must have its power over certain
rights clearly limited.65 This view was widely shared, and the
Virginia representatives insisted when they ratified the Consti-
tution that the "liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be
cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of
the United States."6 6 The implication of the statement was
clear-the Constitution should forbid not only Congress, but
the executive and the judiciary as well, from limiting any of the
guarantees of the later first amendment.
Madison wanted even more. Possibly anticipating a situa-
tion such as Near and clearly responding to the repressive be-
havior of some states during the Confederation period, he
advocated an amendment, which he considered the most valua-
62. THE IEDERALIST No. 84, at 580 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
63. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 17, 1788), re-
printed in TnE COMPLETE MADISON 254 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 254-55.
66. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTrrrmON 653 (2d ed. J. Elliot 1941) (hereinafter cited as DE-
BATES). See aLso &. RuTLAND, THE BroTH OF THE BIL OF RIGHTS 162-74 (1955).
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ble in the whole list, stating that "no State shall violate the
equal right of conscience, [or of the] freedom of the press...
because it is proper that every Government should be dis-
armed of powers which trench upon those particular rights."67
"I cannot see any reason," he stated, "against obtaining even a
double security on those points .... [I]t must be admitted, on
all hands, that the State Governments are as liable to attack
these invaluable privileges as the General Government is, and
therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against."68 Neither
of these proposals was adopted, leaving freedom of the press
susceptible to state encroachment and to limitation by the
courts and the executive branch.69 Nonetheless, when the first
amendment was finally added to the Constitution, it initially
appeared strong enough to support Madison's general view that
in this new American democracy, the power of censorship
should be exercised by the people over the Government, and
not by the Government over the people.
The question remained regarding the first amendment's le-
gal and theoretical meaning. There seemed little question what
it meant to certain leaders. Madison generally agreed with Jef-
ferson's view regarding exemption from prior restraints, 70 but
Madison advocated liability for false publication. He also fa-
vored exemption of the press from liability for "true facts." De-
spite such qualifications, however, he proposed an amendment
which declared only that "Congress shall make no law abridg-
ing freedom of speech or of the press."'' v What this meant was
67. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-41 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
68. Id. at 441.
69. Possibly this omission stemmed from Madison's growing belief that the
courts should not be restrained for fear their strong obligation to protect the
Bill of Rights might somehow be regrettably qualified. As he stated on June 8,
1789 when advocating a Bill of Rights in the first Congress,
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of
those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every as-
sumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be natu-
rally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.
Id. at 439.
70. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
71. 2 B. ScnwARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 1160
(1971). The conference committee, of which Madison was a member, wrote the
language after the Senate eliminated Madison's proposal prohibiting the states
from infringing on freedom of conscience, speech, and press. Id. at 1145-46,
1159. Freedom of speech and press were guaranteed separately in two explicit
clauses. This raised questions about their similarity or differences and pro-
duced a controversy that erupted into a modern debate both on and off the
bench. In a 1974 speech to the Yale Law School, Justice Potter Stewart con-
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clear. What it did not mean was not. Evidence from all sides
indicates agreement that this phraseology clarified Congress's
powerlessness to authorize restraints in advance of publication,
whether by means of a licensing act, a tax act, a sedition act, or
any other form of legislative restriction. On the other hand,
nothing in the amendment's wording denied that the federal
courts could exercise jurisdiction over common law crimes
against the United States. During the next half-dozen years,
the federal courts tried a variety of these crimes, including in-
dictments of editors for seditious libel.72 Further, the elimina-
tion from the final draft of the provision restricting the states
from violating freedom of the press implied that the amend-
ment clearly reserved legislative authority in the field of speech
and press to the states. This situation continued unchanged
until the enactment of the infamous Sedition Act of 179873 by
the highly partisan Federalist leadership in Congress.
III. GOVERNMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IN OPERATION
Although "[t]here was little discussion of freedom of
tended that the free press guarantee of the Constitution deliberately extended
special protection to the publishing business, "the only organized private busi-
ness that is given explicit constitutional protection." Address by Justice Stew-
art, Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted in
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L. J. 631, 633 (1975). The press, he argued,
was specially designated in the Constitution to be autonomous of the govern-
ment, so that it might provide "organized, expert scrutiny of government." Id.
at 634. As such, it required special proteotions to preserve its independence.
Id. Chief Justice Burger, whose affection for the press is minimal, subse-
quently used a Massachusetts case, First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978), to denounce the Stewart view, arguing that no special protec-
tion exists for the press and that there was no historical basis for such a con-
clusion. Id. at 798 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Beyond that, he contended that
the very process of defining who might be entitled to any special protections is
perilous and "is reminiscent of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and
Stuart England-a system the First Amendment was intended to ban from this
country." Id. at 801. On this controversy see Lange, The Speech and Press
Clauses, 23 U.CJ.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Re-
dundance: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 639
(1975); Abrams, Two Theories of Press Freedom are Paralle4 Yet Bound to Meet,
N.Y. Times, May 7, 1978, at 11, col. 1.
72. In a letter to John Adams in February, 1789, Chief Justice John Cush-
ing of Massachusetts expressed clearly the limited liberalism present after the
adoption of the Constitution, pointing out that while prior restraint was unac-
ceptable, subsequent punishment was certainly in line, since falsehood and
scandals against the government should be punished "with becoming rigour."
Grinnell, Hitherto Unpublished Correspondence Between Chief Justice Cushing
and John Adams in 1789, MAss. L. Q., Oct. 1942, at 12-16.
73. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596.
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speech and of the press when Congress was considering
amendments to the Constitution,"74 Congressional passage and
federal enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798
sparked a crisis that elicited a massive public debate on the
subject. In this debate, the Federalists defended these repres-
sive laws on the grounds that they constituted an important
and constructive reform; they went well beyond the English
common law to embrace the principle of truth as a defense in a
libel action as well as endorsing the use, as in the 1735 Zenger
case, of this plea to the juries.7 5 Anti-Federalist opponents re-
lied on the earlier position of Cato as they developed an elabo-
rate body of new libertarian principles denouncing the new
governmental restriction on speech and freedom of the press.
Jefferson's and Madison's famed Kentucky and Virginia Reso-
lutions denounced Federalist strictures and the logic support-
ing them, setting forth a theory of states' rights which became
the cornerstone for those who opposed restrictive or punitive
federal policies. When he spelled out the position ultimately
approved by the Virginia legislature in January, 1800, Madison
summarized aspects of this new libertarian position well, argu-
ing at one point:
In the United States, the great and essential rights of the people are
secured against legislative, as well as against executive ambition. They
are secured not by laws paramount to prerogative, but by constitutions
paramount to laws. This security of the freedom of the press requires,
that it should be exempt, not only from previous restraint by the exec-
utive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this
exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption not only from the
previous inspection of licenser, but from the subsequent penalty of
laws. The state of the press, therefore, under the common law, cannot,
in this point of view, be the standard of its freedom in the United
States. 7
6
These public positions, plus the vigorous writing of leading
contemporary legal scholars such as George Hay, John Thom-
son, and Tunis Wortman,7 7 the strong statements on the floor of
74. PERRY & COOPER, supra note 51, at 425.
75. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2985-93 (1799).
76. THE VmIGnuA REPORT OF 1799-1800, at 220 (1850). "It would be mock-
ery," he pointed out elsewhere in the Report, "to say that no laws shall be
passed preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be
passed for punishing them in case they should be made." Id.
77. Wortman went so far as to contend that there was no such thing as a
law of seditious libel. That crime, he concluded, could "never be reconciled to
the genius and constitution of a Representative Commonwealth." T. WORTmAN,
A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITCAL ENQUIRY 262 (1800). One "distributor" of
such views was St. George Tucker, a Virginia judge and law professor, whose
American version of Blackstone was standard legal fare in the period and the
textbook of several generations of law students. Tucker flatly rejected Black-
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Congress by men like Albert Gallatin, John Nicholas, Nathaniel
Macon, and Edward Livingston, and the legal arguments of de-
fense counsel such as George Blake in Sedition Act prosecu-
tions, moved the free press argument toward a rejection of the
strait-jacket doctrines of Blackstone, the common law, and the
Federalist concept of a federal common law of crimes.78 The
free press proponents scorned the no-prior-restraint definition
as inadequate protection for a truly free press and insisted that
the press be free from subsequent restraints as much as from
prior restraints.
This activity moved the country toward a new theory and
law of freedom of the press. The press was now far more se-
cure than it had been under the ambiguous protection in the
first amendment. The new, more expansive interpretation of
the first amendment led to a constitutional presumption that
the press is free not only from prior restraint but from certain
aspects of subsequent punishment. This became the rule for
the federal and state courts, freeing the press from frivolous re-
strictions imposed by momentary majorities.79 Ironically, Alex-
ander Hamilton placed a cap upon this early liberalizing
process. As an attorney in People v. Croswell,80 which involved
an alleged seditious libel of President Jefferson, he defended
his journalist client on the grounds that freedom of the press
"consists in the right to publish, with impugnity, truth, with
good motives, for justifiable ends, though reflecting on govern-
ment, magistracy, or individuals."81 Subsequently truth, if pub-
lished with good motives and for justifiable ends, gradually
became a defense in American law and a test which the Minne-
sota gag law had to pass if it was not to be ruled an unjustifi-
able restriction on free press. 82
stone's concept of no prior restraint, suggesting in virtually an "absolutist fash-
ion" that the press should be equally free from subsequent punishment. See L.
LFvY, supra note 46, at 717-26.
78. This concept of a federal common law of crimes against the United
States produced considerable litigation in the 1790s. These cases, heard in fed-
eral courts, even included common law indictments for the crime of seditious
libel See J. SMrrE, FREEDOM'S FETrERS 95, 183-84, 188-200 (1956). The issue was
eventually settled by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson & Good-
win, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
79. First amendment absolutism, while suggested, was not adopted in this
period. It was enunciated strongly, however, by George Hay, who contended
that a free government cannot be criminally attacked by the opinion of its citi-
zens. For Hay, freedom of the press, like chastity, was either "absolute" or did
not exist. G. HAY, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF =H PRESS 23-24 (1799).
80. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804).
81. Id. at 337.
82. While Hamilton lost his case, the New York legislature quickly re-
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In the years after the Croswell case until the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the press in practice, while
almost totally exempt from federal restraint, was subject to cer-
tain forms of state restriction. During that period, state re-
straint of the press produced little punishment for written
statements other than criminal libel,8 3 and state prosecution for
defamation of any citizen existed alongside the civil suit by the
damaged party. But evidence indicates there was broad free-
dom to accuse, charge, question motives, and comment openly.
Only an occasional civil or criminal libel action was filed to un-
dermine such practice. States imposed little restraint on criti-
cism of public officials.
One case, however, does stand out as an exception. James
H. Peck, a federal judge in Missouri, attempted to use the con-
tempt power to strike at an attorney's criticism of one of his
opinions.84 The attorney, Luke Lawless, wrote a newspaper ar-
ticle pointing out errors in the judge's decision. After the judge
cited Lawless for contempt of court, found him guilty, and sus-
pended him from practice for eighteen months, the attorney
persistently petitioned Congress to impeach the judge. After
four years, his efforts succeeded when the House of Represent-
atives voted to present articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The long and exhaustive impeachment proceedings focused on
the central issue of whether courts could punish only contempt
committed in the presence of the judge that immediately dis-
rupted proceedings, or whether they could also punish "con-
structive contempt" committed outside the courtroom. In the
final analysis, the Senate exonerated the judge, but made it
clear that it wanted no more convictions for "constructive con-
tempt."85 Shortly thereafter Congress passed a statute limiting
punishment to disturbances that "[p]alpably disrupt the ad-
sponded in 1805 with an Act Concerning Libels, ch. 90, 4 N.Y. Laws 232, making
"truth-at least when published with good motives and for justifiable ends...
a defense for the accused ... and giving the jury the right to find the law in
criminal prosecutions for libeL" H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAM-
ILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 40-41 (1967). Other states were slow to follow.
Massachusetts failed to adopt a statute providing for truth as a defense in a li-
bel action until 1855. Act of May 19, 1855, ch. 396, 1855 Mass. Acts 782-83.
83. Both the federal government and the states attempted to keep "incen-
diary" material out of the mails. During the Civil War, Postmaster General
Montgomery Blair assumed the authority to remove from the mails, or forbid
delivery of, anti-union writing and of material he considered obscene. H. NEL-
SON, supra note 82, at xxii, xxv.
84. See A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 3 (1833).
85. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM.
L REv. 401, 423-30 (1928).
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ministration of justice."86 The case reflected the values of the
period, with freedom most often the rule and restraint the ex-
ception.87
The Civil War period was an exception to this aura of free-
dom. War news was managed by the federal government, and
states took certain actions along similar lines, generally in the
name of national security. Thus, the issue of federal policy re-
garding freedom and the state's relationship thereto did not at-
tract public interest until the Reconstruction period. At that
time, the move for the fourteenth amendment was preeminent.
And old and modern authorities strongly disagree about the im-
plications of that most central section of the modern Constitu-
tion.
IV. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
The Near case is part of the important historical develop-
ment of the fourteenth amendment as an integral part of the
Constitution after 1868. Once again, the historical background
is essential to a full understanding of both the importance of
the amendment itself, in the general area of the relationship of
government to free expression, and in understanding how Near
interrupted a long body of interpretation to change the course
of constitutional law.
The fourteenth amendment brought about a new constitu-
tional relationship between the government and its citizens.
Federal citizenship was constitutionally defined for the first
time, as the amendment set forth the rights that citizenship
guaranteed: federal protection against state abrogation of the
privileges and immunities of federal citizens, the right to equal
protection of the laws, and the right to due process of law. Pre-
cisely what those legal phrases meant, however, and what ex-
plicit actions of the states should be restrained by federal
authority was unclear. In fact, the question of the intent of the
framers of the fourteenth amendment, particularly as it applied
to the Bill of Rights, has remained an ongoing controversy from
that day to the present.88 Justice Hugo Black turned the ques-
86. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 98, 4 Stat. 487.
87. This policy was altered only by the slavery issue and the increasingly
nervous desire on the part of southern leaders to restrain inflammatory litera-
ture which would stir up slave revolts or arouse sufficient interest in the slav-
ery question to produce public disturbances.
88. Since Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the
Supreme Court's rule was that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal
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tion into a public policy issue in the late 1940s, insisting that
the modern Bill of Rights should be totally incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment because that was the initial intent
of the amendment's framers.89 Although scholars challenged
Black in subsequent years,9 0 the confrontation ultimately pro-
duced far more heat than historical illumination, raising both
erroneous and, in the final analysis, unanswerable questions.
One answerable query is how the courts interpreted the four-
teenth amendment's relation to the press in the years from 1868
to 1931, and what impact those interpretations had upon the
dispersal of public information in that period.
The meaning of the term "liberty" in section 1 of the
amendment is central to a description of the way the four-
teenth amendment readjusted the relationship of the federal
government to the states, and the relationship of both levels of
government to freedom of the press.91 Did that term obligate
the federal government to step in when the states threatened
the exercise of personal freedoms such as speech, press, and
government and did not limit the states. The legislators who had primary re-
sponsibility for the fourteenth amendment, John Bingham in the House of Rep-
resentatives and Jacob Howard in the Senate, both intended an expansive
meaning for section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, making clear in their Con-
gressional floor statements that the amendment's purpose was to overrule Bar-
ron. Thaddeus Stevens expressed a similar view in the House on May 8, 1866,
stating that "[t]he Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a
limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and allows Con-
gress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which
operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (emphasis in original). Raoul Berger in Govern-
ment By Judiciary (1977) challenges this point of view, but Berger's conten-
tions are thoroughly invalidated by the far more exhaustive and impressive
research of Robert Kaczorowski. See R. Kaczorowski, The Nationalization of
Civil Rights: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a Racist Society, 1866-1883
(1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in University of Minnesota Library).
See also Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 396 (1973).
89. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1948).
90. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STA. L REV. 5, 139 (1949); Morrison,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial
Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 171-73 (1949); Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's
Fourteenth Amendment, 53 MIN. L REv. 711, 714-16, 721-22 (1969).
91. Section 1 reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
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assembly? If this were the case, which of the three federal
branches had that obligation, and what other forms of state ac-
tivity were clearly eligible for proscription? The answers re-
quired a comprehension of federalism as it existed at the time
of the ratification of the fourteenth amendment and its develop-
ment in later years.
From the late 1820s, courts generally conceded that the
states could employ their inherent 'police power" for the pres-
ervation and proper functioning of local institutions.92 Such au-
thority included the ability to enact a wide variety of
regulations designed to promote public convenience, general
welfare, prosperity, and an orderly state of society.93 Further,
the police power extended to all public needs including, but not
limited to, the health, morals, or safety of the community. The
legislature had the authority to determine not only what the
public interest required, but also the measures necessary to
protect that public interest. Further, courts did not see the po-
lice power as a threat to individual liberty even when certain
state-imposed restrictions seemed potentially coercive.
Certainly, a minority of Americans in 1866 and 1867 viewed
the new fourteenth amendment as an instrument for under-
mining the type of social control they believed was essential to
local stability and maintenance of peace. In fact, the majority
of northerners viewed the fourteenth amendment as an instru-
ment for protecting the freed Black from the excesses of south-
ern legislatures who were determined to reinstitute a state of
subservience through legislation like the Black Codes of late
1865 and 1866.94 The full import of the fourteenth amendment,
however, had yet to be hammered out through case law.
The first attempt to bring the right of free expression under
the protection of the fourteenth amendment was made in 1871,
only three years after the amendment's ratification. In United
92. Even the Republican Party, the political heir to the nationalist senti-
ments of the Federalists and the Whigs, acknowledged on the eve of the Civil
War the obligation to "preserve the rights of the states... inviolate, .. . and
especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institu-
tions... [,J 'rights' essential to that balance of power on which the perfection
and endurance of our political fabric depends." The phrasing comes from reso-
lutions two and four of the Republican Party Platform of 1860. K. PORTER & D.
JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PiATFORms 32 (1956). See also W. BENNETT, AMERI-
CAN THEORIES OF FEDERAIASM 168-69 (1964).
93. See State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 460, 219 N.W. 770, 771
(1928).
94. The temporary southern legislatures of the first year of Andrew John-
son's presidency were responsible for the Black Codes.
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States v. Hall,95 two Alabama Ku Klux Klansmen were in-
dicted for violating section 6 of the Congressional Enforcement
Act of 1870.96 The law made it a federal crime to conspire with
the intent to oppress and to intimidate United States citizens,
and to prevent and to hinder their free exercise and enjoyment
of the right of free speech and assembly, both being "right[s]
and privilege[s] granted and secured to them by the Constitu-
tion of the United States."97 A demurrer to this indictment was
overruled by Circuit Court Judge Woods, who found that the
original Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not grant courts
the power to protect people from state infringement of their
first amendment rights. He asserted, however, that since the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, these privileges, which
were denominated fundamental, belonged "of right to the citi-
zens of all free states."98 They were, he contended, privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States secured by the
Constitution, which Congress has the power to protect by ap-
propriate legislation.
The ruling appears to sustain, on its face, that "liberty" in
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment could and did in-
corporate first amendment rights. Supreme Court decisions
soon, however, overshadowed Hall. In 1875, the Justices ruled
in United States v. Cruikshank99 that the fourteenth amend-
ment added nothing to the fundamental rights of citizens under
the Constitution. When the plaintiff argued that Louisiana in-
fringed his rights of federal citizenship, the Court responded
that the rights he demanded were not rights enjoyed by reason
of federal citizenship, nor were they secured by any section of
the Federal Constitution. Eight years later in the famous Civil
Rights Cases,o0 0 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitu-
tional the Civil Rights Act of 1875,101 a law passed to enforce
the fourteenth amendment. Ignoring Judge Woods's opinion in
Hall that Congress had the authority to protect certain basic
rights, the Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutional, rea-
soning that the fourteenth amendment did not invest Congress
with the power to legislate upon subjects within the domain of
state jurisdiction.1 02 Woods, by this time a member of the
95. 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
96. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
97. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 79 (C.C.SJD. Ala. 1871).
98. Id. at 81.
99. 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876).
100. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
101. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
102. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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United States Supreme Court, concurred in the ruling. Only
Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, arguing vehemently
that the purpose of the 1875 Civil Rights Act was to protect not
only the political, but also the social rights of United States citi-
zens from state infringements. The term "liberty" in section 1
of the fourteenth amendment, Harlan contended, clearly cov-
ered those political and social rights.103
For the next thirty years, litigants attempted to overturn
certain state measures by bringing various fundamental, civil,
and personal rights under the protection of the fourteenth
amendment. 04 The due process and equal protection clauses
were the ultimate vehicles in these attempts, because the
Court, beginning in 1873, repeatedly ruled against any attempt
to nationalize these rights under the privileges and immunities
clause.105 By and large such efforts failed, since they flew in
the face of the climate of the period and its general value struc-
ture.
In many ways, the search for the traditional meaning of lib-
erty and first amendment guarantees was lost in the dynamism
of social and institutional change occurring during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. This change affected both
American values and public law and influenced in important
ways the relationship of the state to the citizen. At the time
when a small group of liberal attorneys and public statesmen
sought some answer to the relationship of first amendment
rights to the new fourteenth amendment, the vast majority of
American statesmen and the conservative members of the bar
sought to convert that amendment into a new bastion of protec-
tion for an emerging entrepreneurial class. This class was al-
ready in the process of converting the nation from an agrarian,
decentralized, and informal society, into an industrial, urban,
and centralized modern state. 06 The conservatives won. Per-
103. Id. at 46-49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104. See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
HARv. L. Rav. 431, 436 (1926). Warren points out that in at least 20 cases be-
tween 1877 and 1907 the Supreme Court had been urged to define "liberty" in
personal rights terms.
105. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 8 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
106. Abraham Lincoln probably anticipated this shift, commenting at one
point:
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the
American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for
liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing.
With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases
with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others the same
word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and
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sons in positions of power in the economic, political, and legal
worlds set out early to define "liberty" in the fourteenth
amendment in ways useful to themselves. This process inevita-
bly meant an eclipse of public interest in clarifying the four-
teenth amendment's relation to freedom of the press. It also
meant a rethinking of the meaning of state police power, a term
previously understood as a virtually uninhibited prerogative of
the local community.
The rethinking process began publicly in 1873 when the
Supreme Court, in The Slaughterhouse Cases 0 7 upheld a Loui-
siana law, seeking to clean up a health hazard granting a mo-
nopoly over the slaughtering of livestock to one firm to enable
the state to better monitor and regulate the butchering busi-
ness. Justice Stephen Field, a conservative Californian closely
tied to powerful business interests, argued in his dissenting
opinion that "liberty" was not a value rooted principally in spir-
itual and humane considerations, freeing the citizen from indi-
vidual restraints; instead, it protected the opportunity to
acquire and use wealth. Liberty, Field argued, entailed the
right of citizens to pursue the ordinary avocations of life, to ac-
quire property, and to pursue happiness.108 When the state in-
terferes with this process, it opposes the whole theory of free
government. "It requires no aid from any bill of rights to
render [such state action] void."' 09
Field clearly attempted to bring a substantive protection
for economic liberty into the Constitution, in this instance, by
way of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities
clause. The Justice failed to persuade a majority of the Court,
but this failure only steeled his determination to prevail. Four
years later, in Munn v. llinois,11o a case testing the regulatory
provisions of the Illinois Granger Laws, he maintained that the
fourteenth amendment relieved property from any public obli-
gation except those recognized by the law of nuisance. "I
deny," he said categorically, "the power of any legislature
under our government to fix the price which one shall receive
the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different, but
incompatible things, called by the same name, liberty. And it follows
that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two differ-
ent and incompatible names-liberty and tyranny.
Quoted in E. GERHART, AMERICAN LIBERTY AND "NATURAL LAW" vi (1953).
107. 83 U.S. (16 WalL) 36 (1873).
108. Id. at 101-02 (Field, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 111 (Field, J., dissenting).
110. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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for his -property of any kind."111 The term "property" in the
due process clause, he went on to contend, should be given the
most liberal construction possible. It includes not only the
physical possession of and the title to property, but the use and
income of property as well.112 The police power cannot justify
rate-fixing, because the question of price is unrelated to the
objectives of the police power.113 Thus, the owner of property
should be free to do as he wills, subject only to "the general
and rational principle that every person ought so to use his
property as not to injure his neighbors."" 4
Although Justice Field's statements were, as in The
Slaughterhouse Cases, again issued in dissent, time and eco-
nomic power were with him. Within the next two decades, his
views not only prevailed, but the term "liberty" in the four-
teenth amendment also came to be interpreted in terms of "lib-
erty of contract." Any state action deemed to impose
unreasonable restraints on how a person conducted his busi-
ness became a denial of his liberty "without due process of
law.""l5
The impact of this major redefinition of legal terms upon
other non-economic forms of liberty was intriguing. Although
Field became irate over the plight of Louisiana butchers de-
prived of their employment by a state health law, he was totally
unmoved by contemporaneous efforts to enforce the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause on behalf of the civil
rights of Blacks,116 or its due process clause to insure a fair
trial to the convicted Haymarket anarchists." 7 Broadly stated,
this shift meant that liberty was so infused with property con-
siderations, in the traditional Lockean sense, that to charge
successfully that liberty had been impaired, one needed to
demonstrate that the state restraint had adverse effects upon
property. If a plaintiff could demonstrate that tie, certain per-
sonal freedoms might be validated. If, however, state con-
111. Id. at 152 (Field, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 141-43 (Field, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 148-53 (Field, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 136-54 (Field, J., dissenting).
115. The Supreme Court first openly embraced the "liberty of contract" con-
cept derived from Adam Smith in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897);
courts used it in the next three decades principally to invalidate state laws reg-
ulating conditions of labor.
116. See Justice Field's dissenting opinions in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 349 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 324 (1879); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879).
117. See Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); text accompanying note 132 in-
fra.
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straints did not unwarrantedly infringe upon a person's
property rights, courts normally sanctioned their use as an ac-
ceptable exercise of traditional state police power." 8
Judicial rulings from this period offer consistent examples
of the economic dominance of the meaning of "liberty." The
Salvation Army was heavily committed to advancing its cause
through street-corner speaking, literature distribution, and pa-
rades. Local municipalities frequently attempted to impose
certain restrictions on this organization by requiring it to se-
cure permission prior to conducting its activities. Few persons
considered the Salvation Army's activities a threat to property
rights. Indeed, a number of civic leaders saw the organization
as instrumental in alleviating some of the suffering which pro-
duced worker discontent and general alienation. Thus, in a
number of states in the 1880s and 1890s, authorities recognized
the Salvation Army's right to raise money and to distribute lar-
gesse to the needy through street speeches and parades. As
the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in an 1886 case, "it is only
when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create
public disturbances, or operate as nuisances, or create or mani-
festly threaten some tangible public or private mischief, that
the law interferes."" 9
In contrast, when William Davis, a controversial figure, at-
tempted to preach without a permit on the Boston Common in
contravention of a Boston municipal ordinance, the potential
threat he posed to the public peace was sufficient to produce
his prosecution. Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes saw no free
speech issue involved in the case.120 When Davis appealed to
the Supreme Court, Justice White also failed to recognize a
free speech issue, premising his decision to sustain the state on
118. See R. McCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTER-
PRISE 107-23 (1951). This period saw another operational qualifier afford an ex-
cuse for denying personal rights: only the successful were deserving and,
thereby, capable of handling rights responsibly. This clearly excluded Blacks,
American Indians, recent immigrants, women, and the destitute. See P. MuR-
PHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 43-
45 (1979).
119. In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 405, 30 N.W. 72, 75 (1886). See also Anderson
v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 179, 19 P. 719, 722 (1888); State ex rel. Gar-
rabod v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 595, 54 N.W. 1104, 1107 (1893).
120. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167
U.S. 43 (1897). Commenting on Justice Holmes's opinion, Max Lerner wrote:
"It is possible that the reason why Holmes took the narrower view in the pres-
ent case was that he was writing in a relatively less turbulent social context,
when no concrete issues of freedom of speech had arisen, and he was loath to
launch on the broad sea of social philosophy." M. LEmER, THE MIND AND FAITH
OF JUSTICE HOLMES 106 (1943).
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Davis's lack of property interest in the Commons. He quoted
Holmes's opinion: "For the legislature absolutely or condition-
ally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no
more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his
house.'21 Further, the Justices flatly refused to incorporate
the protections of the first amendment into the fourteenth
amendment. There were, therefore, no constitutional grounds
for usurping the state police power; the mayor and city council
that regulated expression to promote the general enjoyment of
public land did not infringe upon first amendment freedom.
The opinion met with general approval. One contemporary ar-
gued, "the rule of common-sense and of the public interest [is]
not to allow public property set aside for one purpose to be
used, at the whim of a few individuals, for another purpose."l 22
Thus, if personal liberty forbade absolute prohibition of speech,
public order demanded its reasonable regulation.12 3 Similarly,
when a socialist, Abe Sugarman, set out to test a Minneapolis
city anti-loitering ordinance designed to preserve the public or-
der, the Minnesota Supreme Court sustained his conviction,
maintaining that the ordinance was a perfectly reasonable reg-
ulation. 2 4 Thus, as Alexis Anderson cogently pointed out, if
the courts did not wish to honor a first amendment claim,
one of the triology of police power concerns (safety, health, or morals)
was inevitably cited. These regulatory principles had been a tradi-
tional subject of nineteenth century jurisprudence; First Amendment
doctrines were only now being hammered out. Thus the novelty of the
constitutional claims, coupled with the-era's understandable fear of
mass violence, goes far in explaining the deference paid local offi-
cials. 125
The uninhibited use of private property in relationship to
the right of free expression also became a public policy ques-
tion. Here federal protection of free speech and free press was
121. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
122. Reynolds, Reasonable Restrictions Upon Freedom of Speech, 9 Am. Soc.
Socy 46, 56 (1914).
123. The patterns were national In New York, left-wing street speakers
were arrested for violating the public's right to free access of the streets, and
the judges summarily rejected first amendment claims. People v. Wallace, 85
A.D. 170, 172, 83 N.Y.S. 130, 132 (1903); People v. Pierce, 85 AD. 125, 125, 83
N.Y.S. 79, 79 (1903). In Georgia, even though a South Carolina professor dis-
tributed circulars in advance of his speech, asking that people not block the
sidewalks or streets, he was arrested and his free speech claims were denied.
Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 572, 49 S.E. 793, 795 (1905).
124. State v. Sugarman, 126 Minn. 477, 148 N.W. 466 (1914).
125. Anderson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870-1915,
24 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 74 (1980).
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also essential, especially since private suppression was often
carried out with the covert approval of state authorities. But
from the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment a
serious question remained concerning whether the fourteenth
amendment reached private speech. The courts gave little en-
couragement. The Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases
clearly stated that the fourteenth amendment's section 1 provi-
sions were confined to actions by the states. "Individual inva-
sion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
amendment," wrote Justice Bradley for the Court. 2 6 "[Clivil
rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individ-
uals, unsupported by State authority .... "127 If the meaning
of this statement was not clear from the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Harlan clarified it in his ringing dissent. He argued that
the federal government had an obligation to protect citizens in
their rights not only against formal state deprivation, but
against assaults upon those rights by private individuals.128
Harlan, however, persuaded none of his brethren. The majority
opinion instead sent a message to the federal courts: only if
the case involved state action and only if that state action
threatened property rights, would the federal courts intervene
to protect the constitutional rights of federal citizens.
In summary, the federal courts would protect property
rights against state action. Resolution of other questions re-
garding the relationship of the state to the individual and his
rights would generally be left to the state. Thus, in the
landmark Hurtado v. California 129 case in 1884, involving a Cal-
ifornia citizen who contended that California courts denied him
due process by convicting him of a felony without a grand jury
indictment, Justice Matthews argued that it would not be wise
for the states to be bound by any fixed set of procedures in
criminal cases. 130 Thus state courts could very largely operate
as they wished, and unless gross departures from basic proce-
dures occurred, their operation was beyond federal supervi-
sion, despite the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Spies v. Illinois,131 a case resulting from the fa-
mous Haymarket riot in Chicago in the mid-1880s, Spies and
126. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id. at 43, 59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
130. Id. at 529.
131. 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
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others were charged with responsibility for the Haymarket
bombing, on the theory that his speeches and writings consti-
tuted a conspiracy to induce the resulting violence. Spies's at-
torneys contended that although the Bill of Rights had not
limited the states, so far as they secured and recognized funda-
mental rights, they were privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States and were now protected against state
abridgment by the fourteenth amendment.132 The Court ulti-
mately decided the case on other grounds, 33 but in a series of
subsequent cases it confronted this argument and rejected it.
Again, the dissenting Justice Harlan would argue that the four-
teenth amendment in effect incorporated the Bill of Rights and
made them effective restraints on state civil liberties violations.
The railroading of Spies and three other alleged anarchist
conspirators to the gallows riled growing working-class discon-
tent and disaffection. In fact, the Haymarket martyrs became
symbols for working class protest and for capitalist injustice for
the next two decades. The Spies case stimulated strikes, pick-
eting, boycotts, and labor organizing activities. When workers
refused to move the trains during the famed Pullman strike of
the mid-1890s, the nation's railroad system was brought virtu-
ally to its knees. 34
This situation led to two peripheral developments, both leg-
acies of the Court's earlier interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment. Both ultimately related to the Near case. One in-
volved the growing use of private power by corporations to con-
tain their critics and their rebellious workers. This took the
form of private detectives, strikebreaking by private militia, the
use of scabs, economic coercion, and cleverly induced commu-
nity sanctions-pressures, in other words, which undermined
individual rights, but which did not constitute state action.
The other development involved the growing use of legal
devices, such as restraining orders and injunctions, which did
not directly restrict free speech, press, and assembly, but could
be used to do so. Supporters of their use argued that they ef-
fectively maintained law and order and the general peaceful
132. Id. at 151-52. Contemporaries frankly admitted that the anarchists
were hung not for murder, but for their utterances. Henry Adams wrote at the
time: "Free discussion does not contemplate such license to press and speech
as will endanger the peace and tranquillity of the community." Adams, Shall
We Muzzle the Anarchists, 1 FORUM 445, 449 (1886).
133. The Supreme Court refused to accept jurisdiction on the grounds that
no fourteenth amendment issue was present. 123 U.S. at 181.
134. See generally A. LINDSEY, THE PuLwd.N STRIKE (1942).
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stability of the community. In practice they provided the police
a green light in suppressing threats to the public peace and led
to breaking up picket lines, sometimes with help from the state
militia.135 If this form of legalized coercion was unsuccessful,
authorities could normally- obtain injunctions from a local
judge, demanding that certain action such as picketing, boycott-
ing, or striking generally be stopped. The defiance of an injunc-
tion normally meant a jail sentence. Breaking the Pullman
Strike through such injunctive relief did much to dramatize
this as a device for suppressing labor, and it soon became a
standard company weapon.
In some ways, however, the most effective manner of deal-
ing with malcontents was through the "creative" enforcement
of a variety of local statutes and ordinances.1 36 Unpopular
speakers and militant demonstrators could be arrested under
ordinances prohibiting trespass, obstruction of traffic, vagrancy,
or general disturbing of the peace. Finally, as the Haymarket
case demonstrated, arrests could be made under conspiracy
laws, which provided a successful way of jailing critics against
whom no other plausible charge could be leveled.
Prosecutions against the press, appearing to reject liberta-
rian views and principles supposedly nailed down one hundred
years earlier, frequently resulted in successful convictions for
obscenity, blasphemy, libel, contempt of court, and licensing
schemes. Whenever the Supreme Court addressed the issue,
the majority seemed more concerned with emphasizing the
limits of freedom of expression than extending its meaning.137
Thus, classic concepts of word crimes justifying restraint of
freedom of speech and press were revitalized in these years as
ways of maintaining control over those who might disrupt the
normal peace and general welfare of the community.
In sum, all of these informal, but nonetheless legal, devices
were well known as successful vehicles for dealing with troub-
lesome citizens for some time before the Near controversy.
Those who used them were well aware that technically they did
not raise embarrassing or troublesome fourteenth amendment
questions, and were thus safe from federal intervention.
In a numbers of ways, the Progressive movement intensi-
fied many of these attitudes and many of these practices.
135. See P. MuRPHY, supra note 118, at 48-49. See also P. MURPHY, THE
MEANINrG OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 116-18 (1972).
136. Anderson, supra note 125, at 64-65.
137. Nelson, Prior Restraint Outlawed, The Michigan Journalist, October 21,
1968, at 10.
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While reflecting no consistent ideology, the general thrust of
progressive leadership in the years from 1901 to the outbreak of
World War I emphasized new forms of social engineering
through law to better the community. Accompanying this view
was a general perspective that individual rights should be sub-
limated to the welfare of the whole; achieving a new sense of
national uplift and governmental efficiency were now the ulti-
mate objectives.138 In such an atmosphere, state police power
gained further respect and adherents; the general feeling was
that public regulation geared to upgrading the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of the community should be given the ben-
efit of the doubt, even if it meant that legitimate businesses
could operate only under certain conditions.139 Generally, the
courts of these years sustained the progressive legislation be-
cause it did not sufficiently violate the liberty of employers.140
These laws covered maximum hours, factory inspection, em-
ployer liability, and worker's compensation, as well as cen-
sorship measures and forms of local prohibition. One Massa-
chusetts statute even required compulsory smallpox vaccina-
tion of all citizens.141 The Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice John Marshall Harlan, made it clear that it would not
strike down a law imposing substantial limitations upon per-
sonal liberty when the Justices approved of the social purpose
of the legislation in question. Responding to the defendant's
contentions that the state invaded his liberty when the court
sentenced him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refus-
ing to submit to vaccination, and that the law should recognize
the inherent right of every free person to care for himself as he
pleases, Harlan stated:
[LIiberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
138. See generally P. MUPHY, supra note 118, at 36.
139. A federal police power also began to emerge in this particular period.
It was more clearly geared, however, to restricting certain activities considered
detrimental to the public good: prostitution, impure foods, mislabeled drugs,
narcotics, and unhealthy products, from improperly preserved meats to phos-
phorous matches. Federal authority also attacked the abuses of child labor, as
state ineffectiveness became clear. See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION 584 (5th ed. 1955). See generally S. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL
PounrIcs IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1968).
140. The principal exception was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in
which the Court struck down a New York maximum hour law for bakers and
confectionary workers. Holmes's eloquent and famous dissent as well as Bran-
deis's famous brief, providing sociological data to vindicate state social welfare
legislation, went far toward influencing the Court to support future social wel-
fare laws. See 2 J. SMrrH & P. MURPHY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 330-31 (1968).
141. 1902 Mass. Acts, ch. 190, § 1, (current version at MASS. ANN. LAwS ch.
111, § 181 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975)).
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person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is nec-
essarily subject for the common good .... Society based on the rule
that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with dis-
order and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the opera-
tion of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person
to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, re-
gardless of the injury that may be done to others.142
At the turn of the twentieth century, the fourteenth amend-
ment remained an ineffective check on state abrogation of civil
liberties.
V. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
It was in this progressive climate and with these specific
precedents at hand that a court first attempted to bring the
right of freedom of the press under the fourteenth amendment.
The case was Patterson v. Colorado,143 a precedent the Near
Court came to terms with in 1931. Thomas M. Patterson was a
crusading editor of Denver's Rocky Mountain News. A former
Democratic congressman and senator, and a progressive, intent
on cleaning up political corruption, Patterson saw the basis for
much of Denver's problem rooted in the conservative and alleg-
edly business-controlled state supreme court. The Republican
governor at the time, James H. Peabody, was widely accused of
permitting certain powerful corporations to select state
supreme court appointees. In June 1905, the News began a
campaign of exposure, printing page-one editorials and
cartoons accusing the supreme court of corruption in personnel
and judicial decisions.
The justices were baldly proclaimed to be tools of the utility and rail-
road corporations and the Republican bosses. The Court, said the
News, was the "Great Judicial Slaughter-House and Mausoleum," and
a cartoon depicted the Chief Justice as the "Lord High Executioner"
beheading virtuous Democrats. It was no sniping attack.144
Patterson was out front with his charges and defiantly dared
the court to pursue reprisals.14 5 The supreme court picked up
142. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). Harlan went on to
partially qualify his ruling, stating that "[w]hile this court should guard with
firmness every right appertaining to life, liberty or property as secured to the
individual by the Supreme Law of the Land, it is of the last importance that it
should not invade the domain of local authority except when it is plainly neces-
sary to do so in order to enforce that law." Id. at 38.
143. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
144. R. P RmN, THE FmsT HuNDRED YEARs 410-11 (1959).
145. As he wrote at the time, "I am responsible for every one of [the edito-
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the challenge and cited Patterson for contempt, charging that
his libelous assault tended to reflect on the judges' motives and
conduct, and hence, interfered with the administration of jus-
tice in pending cases. Patterson maintained that the state-
ments in the articles were true, that he would prove them, and
that under the first amendment to the Constitution truth was a
defense for an alleged libel. But the supporting brief and the
intricate and lengthy arguments bolstering it proved unavailing
and were unaided by Patterson's final verbal statement:
[This) is the most stupendous indictment that can be framed against
this whole doctrine of constructive contempt....
[N]o matter what penalty the court may inflict, from this time for-
ward I will devote myself-by constitutional amendment if necessary,
... to deprive every man and every body of men of such tyrannical
power, of such unjust and dangerous prerogative, of the ability to say
to publishers of newspapers: 'While about everybody else you may
speak the truth, no matter what our offenses may be, you speak the
truth with the open door of the jail staring you in the face, or the deple-
tion of what you may possess of this world's goods, and probably of
both.' 146
The Colorado bar was appalled. No one had ever called the
supreme court justices tyrants to their face, and despite infor-
mal censure Patterson was unrepentant. Furthermore, Patter-
son was confident that on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court his indictment would be reversed and he would be vindi-
cated. He was naturally disappointed when that body sus-
tained the Colorado court's verdict, maintaining his assaults
represented "contempt" of public officials.147
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the Supreme Court's
opinion, stating that the "propriety and necessity of preventing
interference with the course of justice by premature statement,
argument, or intimidation hardly can be denied."148 Generally,
Holmes pointed out, the Constitution of the United States did
not give the United States Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion over state court libel decisions. The only possible avenue
in the Constitution by which the Supreme Court could review a
rial attacks] and either wrote or approved them. I believe they are fair and just
criticism, and are fully warranted by what has transpired .... I consider the
proceedings against me as direct assault upon the freedom of the press, and I
shall defend that ancient and important prerogative of free people with all my
power." Rocky Mountain News, June 30, 1905, quoted in IL PERKIN, supra note
144, at 411.
146. People v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 397, 399, 84 P. 912,
957-58 (1905) error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney
Gen., 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See R. PERIN, supra note 144, at 412.
147. 205 U.S. at 462-63.
148. Id. at 463.
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state libel decision was through an incorporation of the first
amendment into the fourteenth. Yet Holmes was hesitant to
start down that road. In the Colorado situation, Holmes rea-
soned, the main purpose of the first amendment was to prevent
prior restraint of publication by the government. But once
printed, statements "deemed contrary to the public welfare"
might be punished whether true or false.149 Speaking to the in-
corporation issue, Holmes simply indicated that the Court left
"undecided the question whether there is found in the Four-
teenth Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First."50
Furthermore, he contended that even the assumption that free-
dom of speech and press are protected from abridgment by the
states does not preclude subsequent punishment for state-
ments deemed to be contrary to the public welfare.'15
Thus, the Court sanctioned libel restraints as well as the
power of courts to hold newspapers in contempt. 5 2 These were
not restraints prior to publication and, as a result, were not
considered regulations that impaired freedom of the press.
Each state, was now free to determine the extent to which libel
against officials was confined by the American public's privilege
to freely discuss those officials, with a clear implication that the
public welfare had a higher value than individual freedom. The
Patterson case, in many ways, accurately reflected progressiv-
ism.
Four years after Patterson, the Supreme Court decided an-
other case which reflected the values of the period. The case
involved the head of the American Federation of Labor (AFL),
Samuel Gompers. 5 3 Gompers, although no firebrand, was pre-
pared to fight certain employer tactics with cautious retaliation.
When he received a plea for assistance against the tactics of
149. Id. at 462.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. In a strong dissent, Justice Harlan said that the Civil Rights Cases held
that the thirteenth amendment decreed "universal civil and political freedom
through the United States." He went on to contend that freedom of speech and
press were privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which
"neither Congress nor any State since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment can, by legislative enactments or by judicial action, impair or
abridge.. . ." 205 U.S. at 464-65. This view was again underscored by the
Supreme Court in the case of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
While this suit concerned privacy, not libel, the decision again promoted state
independence in determining controls on speech and press. In this case, the
Court said that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of
the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restriction
about 'freedom of speech. . . .'" Id. at 543.
153. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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the Bucks Stove Company from the Iron Molder's local in St.
Louis, Gompers responded by putting the company on the
AFL's "We Don't Patronize" list published in the organization's
monthly magazine, The American Federationist. The Bucks
Stove Company, supported by the American Anti-Boycott As-
sociation, a financier of earlier legal action against union boy-
cott tactics, asked a federal judge for an injunction terminating
the boycott. The judge promptly enjoined the AFL from com-
bining to injure the company's business and, in particular, from
publishing any printed matter listing Bucks Stove on an "Un-
fair" or "We Don't Patronize" list. The AFL promptly appealed.
Further trouble, however, quickly developed. The injunc-
tion was not to go into effect for five days. During that period,
Gompers hastily rushed another issue of The American Federa-
tionist into print, featuring the Bucks Stove Company. This
brought another law suit for contempt of court; Bucks Stove
charged that the magazine, as well as several public speeches
by Gompers, violated the injunction. A lower court judge
agreed, sentencing Gompers to one year in jail; Frank Morri-
son, editor of The American Federationist, to nine months; and
John Mitchell, President of the United Mine Workers, who co-
operated with Gompers, to six months. 54 This decision, too,
was appealed, and the complex legal actions which reached the
Supreme Court 55 raised difficult questions regarding the labor
injunction as a device to restrain free speech and press. In the
final opinion, Gompers was freed, but he won no points for the
right to free speech. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking
for the Court, did not address the argument that the injunction
was an unconstitutional limitation on freedom of speech and a
prior restraint of the press. The result was a precedent hinder-
ing trade unionists from saying or publishing anything deroga-
tory about a non-union firm. Again the free press, when it
threatened property owners or their prerogatives, clearly
ranked well below economic considerations and the "liberty" of
employers to be free from damaging public pressure.156
In a subsequent case the Court sustained a criminal con-
tempt charge against a Toledo newspaper that criticized a
judge's use of an injunction to stop what the paper believed
was legitimate action. The Court upheld the power of the fed-
154. Re Gompers, 40 App. D.C. 293 (1913).
155. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
156. For a description of the litigation, see E. LiEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE
THE BAR 71-83 (1960).
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eral judge to punish printed criticism, despite the words of the
post-Peck, 1831 statute,157 which seemed to limit the power to
punish misbehavior to the near environs of the Court.5 8 In the
pre-World War I years, rulings such as this indicated the availa-
bility of last-resort options to management, while giving a green
light to more informal restraints on free expression. These re-
straints were carried out effectively, particularly against aggres-
sive and militant union bodies such as the International
Workers of the World (IWW) and radical organizations such as
the Socialist Party and the Non-Partisan League.
VI. SPEECH, PRESS, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
World War I injected another element into the picture-the
formal "criminalization" of "excessive" speech and press.159
Statutory limitations on free expression were minimal in the
years prior to World War I. Following the assassination of
President William McKinley, the state of New York in 1902
passed a criminal anarchy law aimed at securing convictions of
radical agitators who, as American citizens, were ineligible for
deportation. 60 But with the exception of a 1904 case in which a
man who accused another of being an anarchist was charged
with slander,' 6' the measure went unenforced. In addition,
prior to 1917, many state and local authorities preferred to deal
with troublesome expression through the use of informal sanc-
tions rather than run the risk of openly preferring formal
charges. They feared that formal restraint might elicit charges
of free speech and free press violations and, thereby, cast them
in an unfavorable light.
American entry into the war in 1917 radically altered this
climate. The public welfare now became the public safety and
the nation's security, and the federal government for the first
time since the late 1790s enacted legislation restricting speech
and press under the rationale that it was essential to victory.
Attacked by leaders of the nation's press as excessive and dan-
157. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1976)).
158. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). Holmes
and Brandeis dissented, contending there was no showing that the publication
actually interfered with fair court procedures. The decision was ultimately
overruled in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
159. See P. MuRPHY, &upra note 118, at 71-132.
160. For the statute's history, see J. JAFFE, CRUSADE AGAINsT RADICALISM
198 (1975).
161. Von Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 A.D. 130, 87 N.Y.S. 968 (1904).
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gerous,162 the espionage and sedition legislation nevertheless
was passed and enforced. 163 Authorities brought more than
two thousand federal prosecutions and courts imposed criminal
sanctions for a wide variety of forms of expression, belief, and
association.'6
This federal action inevitably inspired the states to follow
suit. A number did so by enacting statutes, which added a
more precise set of criminal remedies to the normal devices for
restricting unpopular expression. The motivations behind
these laws were mixed. Aware of the value of identifying publi-
cally with patriotism and loyalty in a period of national hyste-
ria, many legislatures and state officials rushed to take action
to project a public image of coping quickly and squarely with
the menace of wartime disloyalty. Others saw the climate of
wartime urgency as creating a golden opportunity to act openly
against trouble makers, such as anarchists, socialists, IWW
members, and agrarian radicals in the Non-Partisan League,
previously a difficult task.
The form of this legislation varied. Eleven states passed
sedition statutes providing, in one way or another, for punish-
ment of overt expression.165 By 1918, five states-Idaho, Minne-
sota, Montana, Arizona and South Dakota-where hysteria
about the IWW was particularly rampant, passed criminal syn-
dicalism laws. 66 In addition to these laws, which made it a
162. See P. MuRPHY, supra note 118, at 78-79.
163. Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, § 3, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921). Techni-
cally, this legislation was not libel law in the sense that punishment was pro-
vided for defamatory criticism of those who ran the government. The measure
undoubtedly curtailed expression, and in defying the first amendment was
probably unconstitutional. Its avowed purpose, however, was to punish expres-
sion that tended to incite insubordination and disloyalty during World War L
164. See Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 56-57 (1920). This included a ma-
jor assault on the left wing and foreign language press through applications of
postal laws and regulations to deny use of the mails under certain conditions.
This was itself an effective form of prior restraint, because it killed most of the
publications so banned. See D. FOwLER, UNmAILABLE: CONGRESS AND THE POST
OFFICE 113-15 (1977).
165. These sedition measures did not follow a single model like the Crimi-
nal Syndicalism and Criminal Anarchy Acts. Connecticut punished public ad-
vocacy of "any measure, doctrine, proposal or propaganda intended to
injuriously affect the government," New Jersey punished incitement to insur-
rection or sedition or attempts to do so and banned any book encouraging hos-
tility to the government of the United States or the state; Rhode Island
punished language intended to incite "'a... disregard of the Constitution or
laws." Chafee, Sedition, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 638 (1935).
166. See E. DOwELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LEGISLATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 147 (1939). By the end of 1920, twenty-one states and two
territories enacted similar laws. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(Ohio criminal syndicalism statute violates first and fourteenth amendments).
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crime to use language criticizing the government and opposing
various aspects of the war effort, municipal bodies passed a
vast hodgepodge of local ordinances to criminalize actions or
speech calculated to interfere with the war effort. These ordi-
nances normally left considerable discretion to the district at-
torney to choose which cases to prosecute.
Such laws drew vigorous wartime enforcement. For exam-
ple, the Non-Partisan League was virtually destroyed when its
key leaders were prosecuted under Minnesota's criminal syndi-
calism law.167 Yet, many state leaders believed they were not
enough. With the war's end in November, 1918 and the expira-
tion of the federal espionage and sedition legislation,168 state
legislators in the supercharged post-war atmosphere of strikes,
radicalism, and fear of Bolshevism passed peacetime sedition
and criminal syndicalism statutes, seeking to insure nervous
citizens that the state governments would continue to attack
disloyalty despite the federal government's retreat from the
area.169 This state legislation again took a variety of forms. Ul-
timately, thirty-five states passed some type of "police power"
legislation-sedition, criminal syndicalism, or red flag laws-
geared to protecting the welfare of the local community from
agitators and dangerous seditionists.l7 0 In the early 1920s, this
legislation was widely enforced.'17
Several groups expressed opposition to this particular form
of criminalization. Some of the more militant labor unionists of
the period viewed it as ill-disguised class legislation, designed
167. See P. MURPHY, supra note 118, at 237, 268.
168. This legislation became useless with the end of the war, because it was
unenforceable in peacetime. The Sedition Act Amendment of 1918 was revoked
by Congress in March, 1921.
169. There had been efforts almost immediately after the war ended to en-
act federal sedition legislation to replace the wartime laws. These efforts, how-
ever, drew hostile criticism from a variety of sources, including not only the
liberal community and press, but also the conservative press. Hence, this legis-
lation was eventually defeated, and Congress did not attempt to pass it again
until the Smith Act in 1940. See P. MURPHY, supra note 135, at 40, 64, 84-86.
170. Such legislation enabled a rapid crackdown on speech and written ex-
pression that might produce unlawful actions stimulating improper political or
economic change. For a detailed history of this legislation and a careful state-
by-state record of its framing, see Dowell, A History of the Enactment of Crimi-
nal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States (1936) (2 vols. Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Johns Hopkins University).
171. The Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325
(1920), gave a green light to the enforcement of such legislation. The majority
held that the right of free expression, as secured by the first amendment, was
not absolute; the limitation imposed by the Minnesota statute was thus lawful.
In State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W. 181 (1918), the Minnesota Supreme
Court took an earlier step in that direction.
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to provide state support for employers' suppression of the
union movement. Others objected to it because it constituted
an informal type of preventive or prohibitory legislation de-
vised not actually as punishment for wrongful conduct, but to
prevent future evils through a series of restrictions and qualifi-
cations that seriously jeopardized freedom of expression.
These critics pointed out that there was no legal need or justifi-
cation for such laws, that the criminal codes of the states ade-
quately covered conspiracy and libel. Still others saw it as an
unholy alliance among business, general property interests,
and the state, in which legislators passed intimidating laws
which freed business from the necessity of confronting the
threats to its ongoing success. Such legislation in operation,
the opposition argued, left to the discretion of administrative
officials the authority to restrict troublesome citizens through
the development of standards to fit immediate and local
needs.172 As the decade progressed, the injunction was also up-
graded and used as a complementary precautionary weapon.
Critics raised similar objections to its use, and civil libertarians
launched a nationwide, anti-injunction campaign in the latter
years of the decade.i 73
This history of the 1920s, however, is not the history of
ongoing state repression of radical thought and expression.
Certainly during the first three or four years following the Ar-
mistice, public opposition to those espousing radical causes
was great, and the demands for further government censorship
indeed constituted an obstacle to restoring full peacetime free-
dom of expression. This situation was agitated by certain gov-
ernment officials, particularly Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer,174 who saw an opportunity to cash in on these appre-
172. Some state legislators expressed their fears concerning such laws in
legislative debates. A Washington state Republican legislator argued:
[S]o long as we exalt property rights above human rights-so long as
we tolerate a condition of society in which some heap up wealth they
cannot use while others live in want-so long as the fires beneath our
social structure are fed with the flames of greed and corruption and
special privilege-we must not court disaster by weighing down the
safety valve by the enactment of such a bill as this.
P. Munry, supra note 135, at 45.
173. A leading case was Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), in which the
Supreme Court used both the due process and equal portection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment to overthrow an Arizona anti-injunction law designed to
undermine the use of the injunction against labor. Holmes and Brandeis
strongly dissented. Brandeis particularly expressed his view that "the law of
property was not appropriate for dealing with the forces beneath social unrest."
Id. at 368.
174. See E. DowELL, supra note 166, at 77.
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hensions. He sought to continue using wartime authority and
suppression as a way of courting public favor and building
post-war political careers. But by 1923, the post-war red scare
was almost totally forgotten, in part because the laissez faire
attitude of the decade subtly contributed to popular aversion to
further radical hunting and disloyalty probing by the state. 75
Conversely, some states continued to use the police power
against publications. Here the modernizing developments in
the decade raised new levels of public concern.
VII. STATE POLICE POWER AND A YELLOWING PRESS
The first nine years of the 1920s were the era of the
supreme triumph of the businessman. As President Calvin
Coolidge once stated, "the business of America is business,"V16
and this spirit infused almost every aspect of American life.
Combined with this new spirit was business consolidation and
growth, the rapid development of huge metropolitan centers,
and a massive movement of people from the country to the city,
all of which produced an increasingly depersonalized urban
culture characterized by the automobile, the radio, and the mo-
tion picture. These homogenizing tendencies broke down the
uniqueness of small-town culture and created a greater na-
tional synthesis. Anomie increased among many urban dwell-
ers, and the comfort, convenience, and gossip of the small town
was no longer accessible. Urban newspaper owners and a
growing group of magazine entrepreneurs quickly saw great po-
tential in this market for a type of journalism which would
reach this audience. Other businesses viewed the newspaper
as a means to induce customers to buy their products. Thus,
during the decade the press shifted its emphasis to meet the
needs of a new mass market; as a result, its content and orien-
tation tended to change in several clear ways. As big business
operations, newspapers became increasingly dependent upon
advertising for support and, consequently, dependent upon
burgeoning circulation figures. This attempt to appeal to a pop-
ular audience required increased sublimation of serious news
and thoughtful editorial content to what Silas Bent, in a devas-
175. When Harlan Fiske Stone was appointed Attorney General by Calvin
Coolidge, one of his first acts was to take the Bureau of Investigation out of
politics and to terminate its hunting license for radicals, thus ending one of its
central early activities. See P. MURPHY, TuE CONSTITUTION iN CRISIS TIMES,
1918-1969, at 78-79 (1972).
176. Speech by Calvin Coolidge to the Society of American Newspaper Edi-
tors (Jan. 17, 1925).
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tating expose of the industry in the 1920s, called "the art of Bal-
lyhoo."'1 77 This yellowing journalism frequently tended to be
irresponsible, based upon half-truths, and often employed the
expos6 as a sure-fire method of selling newspapers. Pages
were filled with details of crime, sex and sexual perversion, not
too subtle attacks on minority religious and racial groups,
grossly exaggerated accounts of the questionable morality of
public officials, and scandals surrounding the private lives of
prominent citizens.
One casualty of this development was the decline of older
style, editorially-oriented, political journalism tailored to in-
form people accurately about public issues. That journalism
also considered the complex administration of government and
the need to bring certain kinds of pressure to force it to deal
with corrupt politicians, malfeasance in office, and suspected li-
aisons between organized crime and politicians. Hence, partic-
ularly with the rise of the tabloid, 1920s' journalism offended
many older, more serious Americans, who were still guided by
a vigorous Victorian-Progressive morality and decorum. They
objected to everything about the tabloid-its dishonest, fraudu-
lent, and harmful advertising, its gross misrepresentation of
facts, its deliberate invention of tales calculated to excite the
public, and its wanton recklessness in the use of headlines.
Also offensive to many was the graphic detail of the tabloid's
portrayals of scandals and divorces of rich or prominent people,
its pictures of vicious criminals, prize fighters, and bathing
beauties, its "sob stuff," and its xenophobic jingoing and ill-will
toward other nations. As Felix Frankfurter wrote at the time:
"A low tone, emotionalism, off-emphasis, irrelevance, and ne-
glect are, we submit, the outstanding sources of newspaper
shortcomings. These qualities of news matter fashion the mind
of the public. The public, in its turn, is stimulated to want this
kind of news."178
Parallel to the development of tabloids was the emergence
of a new type of periodical literature again designed to appeal
strongly to the prurient interest of the decade. Sexually-ori-
ented magazines, confession magazines, naughty Vie Pari-
sienne art magazines,? 9 and celebrity magazines featuring the
177. S. BENT, BALLYHOO: THE VOICE OF THE PRESS (1927).
178. L BEMAN, CENSORSHIP OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS 150-51 (1930) (quot-
ing THE CLEvELAND FOUNDATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 524 (1922)).
179. Mandeville, Gutter Literature, 45 NEW REPuBrUc 350 (1926). One na-
tionally popular publication was Captain Billy's Whiz Bang, a "behind the
barn" rag published by Captain Billy Fawcett, a good friend and political sup-
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intimate lives of movie stars, sports heros, and entertainment
figures filled the shelves. One critic in the New Republic re-
ferred to these as "a malady of our civilization."180
Both of these developments led to arguments in the 1920s
that the deteriorating conditions in public morality in the dec-
ade were "produced in considerable measure by the newspa-
pers and magazines."181 Critics argued that the newspapers'
glamorization of crime increased disrespect for the law and
made the United States the most criminal of all civilized na-
tions. As criminologist George W. Kirschwey argued in the
Survey magazine in 1926:
With the automatic gun to paralyze the victim and wayfarers and the
automobile at the curb to ensure a quick get-away, is there any wonder
that the young dare-devils of the criminal profession are attracted to
the game? With the newspapers reporting and dramatizing every de-
tail of every hold-up of this character, the wonder is that more of them
don't go in for it. It is certainly made to look like easy money with a
minimum of risk.1 8 2
The Christian Science Monitor stated in an editorial:
Expert surveys add further corroboration to the evidence that crime
news engenders crime. The persistent glorification of criminals in the
press, the publication of their portraits, the use of laudatory or at least
striking nicknames, and the growing practice of feature writers of
spreading the views and exploits of criminals all over the Sunday pa-
pers, stimulate, encourage, and increase crime. 18 3
There was, however, another dimension to these develop-
ments. The 1920s also saw the emergence of a number of
cheap, ephemeral scandal sheets, which were used for extor-
tion, blackmailing petty crooks, or pressuring concessions from
venal public officials. Many, however, while their tone was
deplorable, actually filled an information gap. In many cities
porter of Floyd B. Olson, the principle prosecutor in the Near case, who later
became Minnesota's Attorney General and Governor. G. MAYER, THE POLiT-
ICAL CAREER OF FLOYD B. OLSON 6 (1951).
180. Mandeville, supra note 179, at 351.
181. Similar blame was not placed on motion pictures or radio, probably be-
cause the movies were not thought of at the time as a corrupted public informa-
tion source. The Supreme Court ruled in 1915 that movies were strictly a
business. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915),
overruled, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). Moreover,
the industry, through its Hays office, began self-censorship early in the decade.
Radio, then in its infancy, was subject to certain regulations at the outset and
in 1927 was placed under federal control through the Radio Act of 1927, a stat-
ute giving the government licensing and policing power over the industry. Act
of Feb. 23, 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. See Note, Previous Re-
straints Upon Freedom of Speech, 31 COLUM. L REV. 1148, 1153 (1931).
182. Kirchwey, Crime Waves and Crime Remedies, 55 SURVEY 593, 595
(1926).
183. See generally L. BEmAx, supra note 178, at 160-61.
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the politicians were in collusion with the business world, which
was closely tied to big newspapers and more interested in cir-
culation based upon scandal and gossip than in performing
honest public information functions. As with the newspapers
and the magazines, the response of a fair segment of the "re-
spectable" public to the scandal sheets was hostile. In the pub-
lic mind these three rather disparate forms of journalistic
endeavor tended to blur together and become synonymous.
Moreover, the respectable public felt victimized and powerless
to retaliate against them all, particularly when suggestions of
regulation or curtailment inevitably met the argument that the
first amendment protected these journalistic activities.184
It was undoubtedly public exasperation which led to wide-
spread demands for censorship and which led one progressive
state, Minnesota, to enact a statute in 1925 to protect the com-
munity against the evils of these forms of business. 85 This law
was subsequently dubbed the "Minnesota Gag Law."'86
The new law was defined in its preamble as "an act declar-
ing a nuisance, the business . .. of regularly or customarily
producing, publishing, or circulating an obscene, lewd, and las-
civious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, or a mali-
cious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical and providing for injunction and other pro-
ceedings."' 87 It provided specifically that the county attorney
or, in his absence, the attorney general or any citizen acting in
behalf of the county attorney, might petition the district court
for a temporary restraining order against any periodical which
allegedly violated the provisions of the act. 88 After a trial on
the merits, the district court judge could grant a permanent in-
junction, by which, in the language of the law, "such a nuisance
may be wholly abated."189 Thus, the law allowed the enjoining
of any publication which, in the opinion of a single judge, was
contrary to public morals. It was, as a popular commentator
184. Even contemporaries, however, considered this posture unpersuasive.
Silas Bent wrote in 1926 that no newspaper reader will "become an active
champion [of press freedom] until newspapers mend their ways ... ,shovel
less smut and print more news." S. BENT, supra note 177, at 377-78.
185. See note 3 supra.
186. The legislative history of the measure is described in Hartmann, The
Minnesota Gag Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 MmN. HIST. 161-62
(1960).
187. Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, 1925 Minn. Laws 358 (held unconstitutional
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 Minn. 697 (1931)).
188. Id. at § 2.
189. Id. at § 3.
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wrote later, "a shining example of... that kind of police power
which makes for governmental tyranny"'190 If the law was ef-
fective, political corruption and business fraud could flourish
without fear of exposure. Failure to comply with the order of
the court would be contempt, punishable by a fine of a thou-
sand dollars or a year in the county jail.
Minnesota's experiment quickly drew warm national ap-
proval as a "wise and desirable remedy" for these evils. 191 The
arguments supporting the law ran as follows: the complications
of ordinary censorship, or prior restraint, make it impractical; it
would be impossible to have government censors read every
magazine and delete every falsehood, exaggeration, indecency,
or obscenity. Censorship would require an enormous staff of
well-paid and highly trained censors and would, therefore, be
expensive and unworkable. Legal actions against undesirable
publications also failed completely. Prosecutions under the
criminal libel statutes failed to result in effective repression or
suppression of such literature. Further, civil actions for dam-
ages could not prevent the harm or a repetition of the offense.
The publicity given to the trial sometimes did more harm than
good. In addition, the expense of the trials and appeals put this
remedy out of the reach of all except the wealthy. Supporters
argued that the Minnesota law could be applied promptly, and
could stop obscenity, indecency, falsehood, and defamation, as
well as end the publication of scandal sheets completely. It
could, in other words, make the journalistic profession respon-
sible again, scare the criminal element among writers and pub-
lishers, and encourage reputable newspapers and magazines.
Freedom of the press would not be impaired. Freedom of the
press, it was argued, never meant a license to publish scandal-
ous, malicious, obscene, or indecent matter. Finally, Gag Law
advocates contended that the first amendment did not limit the
power of the state governments; it merely limited Congress.
Each state could properly regulate its own newspapers,
magazines, and news agencies under its police power.192
Clearly the law created positive regulatory overtones. It
sought to protect the property rights of certain individuals
against blackmailers and scandal mongers who might damage
190. Pollard, Our Supreme Court Goes Liberal, 86 FORUM 193, 198 (1931).
191. See L. BEMAK, supra note 178, at 163. The national student debate topic
for 1930 was: Resolved. That the Minnesota Nuisance Law should be adopted
by every state in the Union. Id. at 145.
192. These arguments are summarized in L. BEMAN, supra note 178, at 146-
48.
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their reputation and standing in the community, injuring them
financially. The purpose of the law placed the public welfare
above any first amendment rights that people might claim. To
the extent that it protected "liberty," the law saw liberty as the
citizen's freedom from the evil impacts of this new journalistic
development; certainly it was not liberty of members of the
"fourth estate" to publish freely what they wished.
But there were other trends in the 1920s, particularly in
first amendment constitutional law, running counter to those
trends which produced the Minnesota Gag Law. Their roots
were in World War I and their culmination, as it turned out,
was in the Supreme Court's ruling in Near v. Minnesota.
VII. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
As the federal government and the states moved during
and after World War I to criminalize certain forms of freedom
of expression, certain citizens concerned with civil liberties ex-
pressed strong apprehension about this development and its
long range implications. In an early wartime case, the Masses
Publishing Company sued in Judge Learned Hand's federal
court in the Southern District of New York to enjoin the New
York postmaster from not delivering the August, 1917 issue of
The Masses, a monthly revolutionary journal containing several
articles, poems, and cartoons attacking the war.1 93 Hand set
out to clarify the boundary line between punishable and non-
punishable expression under the new Espionage Act. Adopting
the position of constitutional expert Thomas M. Cooley, Hand
granted the injunction, pointing out that one could not limit
free speech and press to polite criticism. He contended that
the greater the grievance, the more likely people are to get ex-
cited about it, and the more urgent the need of hearing what
the discontented have to say. 94 The test for the suppression of
expression in a democratic government, Hand stated, is neither
the justice of its substance nor the decency and propriety of its
temper, but the strong danger that it will directly incite injuri-
ous acts. In the Masses case Hand believed that this connec-
tion was not persuasively established.
193. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), 245 F. 102 (2d
Cir.), stay continued, rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
194. 246 F. at 539-40.
[Vol. 66:95
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Although Hand was reversed by a higher court,195 his posi-
tion ultimately precipitated a wartime debate over the permis-
sible limits of freedom of speech and press, a debate in which
he drew strong support from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., of the
Harvard Law School.196 Chafee, like Hand, was persuaded that
freedom of the press was not adequately protected by the
Blackstonian principle of no prior restraint. Clearly this was
too narrow a rule. Both men agreed that a proper considera-
tion of the social interests involved, namely the beneficial inter-
ests in society in the ascertainment of the truth,197 not merely
protection for the public welfare and safety, demanded that
states be limited in their power to hold publishers responsible
for what they print. Thus, both men attempted through their
public statements and private actions to change the Court's
thinking about first amendment freedoms. At approximately
the same time, a group of angry citizens, distressed with the
excesses of wartime repression, organized the National Civil
Liberties Bureau, the antecedent of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union. They intended to transform the question of the re-
striction of civil liberties into a public policy issue and to
secure more favorable protection for individual rights.198
The success of these individuals during the war period was
notably limited. But as first amendment test cases began to
reach the courts in the post-war period, both groups hoped
courts would recognize that the only grounds for suppressing
an expression existed when it did not add truth to the market-
place or it was a demonstrable threat to the public safety or na-
tional security. At the time such a view was alien to the legal
community and to the majority of Americans. They still viewed
195. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.) revg, Masses Pub-
lishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
196. Regarding Chafee, see Auerbach, The Patrician as Libertarian:
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and Freedom of Speech, 42 NEW ENGLAND Q. 51 (1969);
Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear
and Present Danger Test for Free Speeck The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST.
24 (1971).
197. Benjamin Cardozo expressed similar views:
There is no freedom without choice, and there is no choice without
knowledge,--or none that is not illusory. Implicit, therefore, in the very
notion of liberty is the liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget...
The mind is in chains when it is without the opportunity to choose.
One may argue, if one please, that opportunity to choose is more an
evil than a good. One is guilty of a contradiction if one says that the
opportunity can be denied, and liberty subsist. At the root of all liberty
is the liberty to know.
B. CAxmozo, Pardoxes of Legal Science, in SELECTED WRINGS OF BENJAMUN
NATHAN CARDozo 317 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
198. P. MurpHY, supra note 118, at 244.
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liberty as tied closely with property and believed the test for
the permissible limits of free expression turned directly on
whether such expression constituted potential danger to prop-
erty interests. Thus, when the Supreme Court in the first of
the post-war test cases upheld a conviction under the Espio-
nage Act of 1917 on the grounds that the writings constituted a
"clear and present danger" to the nation, free speech advocates
were disappointed.199 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, while
proposing a new test in the first amendment area, hardly de-
parted from his earlier view in the Davis 200 and Patterson201
cases. His opinion lacked the conception that speech might
serve broader social interests, interests which would be disad-
vantaged if denied the ideas which such speech contained.202
Holmes was rebuked publicly by several legal liberals for
authorizing the needless punishment of future utterances. One
authority, Ernest Freund of the University of Chicago Law
School, deplored the decision and the later Supreme Court ac-
tion upholding the sentencing of Socialist leader, Eugene V.
Debs. He called for tolerance for adverse opinions and implied
that Holmes's ruling fostered intolerance. 203 Chafee con-
demned Holmes's limited free expression concept in print. He
also obtained an "audience" with the Justice, now smarting
from growing charges of his insensitivity in the civil liberties
area. Holmes emerged from their ensuing discussion con-
vinced that the first amendment established a national policy
favoring a search for truth, while balancing social interests and
individual interests. 2 04 Shortly thereafter he enunciated this
position in his strong dissent in Abrams v. United States, urg-
ing toleration in an eloquent and, as it turned out, frequently
199. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
200. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167
U.S. 43 (1897). See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
201. Patterson v. Colorado ex reL Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 454 (1907).
See notes 143-51 supra and accompanying text.
202. Holmes at the time wrote to Learned Hand:
[F]ree speech stands no differently from freedom from vaccination.
The occasion would be rarer when you cared enough to stop it, but if
for any reason you did care enough you wouldn't care a damn for the
suggestion that you were acting on a provisional hypothesis and might
be wrong. That is the condition of every act.
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine,
27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 757 (1975).
203. Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19 NEw REPUBLIC 13
(1919).
204. Ragan, supra note 196, at 43.
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quoted statement.205
If first amendment freedoms were to take on a new mean-
ing, however, it was ultimately the states, and not the federal
government, whose role the Court had to clarify. At this point
Justice Louis Brandeis entered the fray and returned to the
long standing legal question regarding the proper meaning of
the term "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment. Brandeis's
public opportunity came in a case in which a leader of the Non-
Partisan League, Joseph Gilbert, was arrested under Minne-
sota's criminal syndicalism law for certain statements opposing
aspects of the government's war effort.206 In his argument for
striking down the law, Brandeis made clear his position: "I
cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and enjoy prop-
erty."207 Brandeis subsequently joined the majority in one case
considering a statute forbidding teaching in the German lan-
guage 208 and addressing a statute requiring all parents to send
their children to public schools.2 09 Justice McReynolds, writing
the majority opinions for both cases, struck down the laws as
violative of property rights. In the first case, he implied chil-
dren were the property of their parents and he deplored the vi-
olation of the parents' right to bring up their children according
to the dictates of their conscience. In the other, he viewed the
state's action as depriving private schools of business and,
thus, property without due process of law, in violation of the
liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The majority
position in both cases implied that "liberty" in the fourteenth
amendment protected personal liberty from state control or
regulation only if it was in some way linked with freedom of
property.
During these years, developments occurred regarding use
of the injunction against free speech and press. This demon-
strated the sharp dichotomy between those committed to free
expression for its own sake and those who continued to view it
only in relationship to property rights. In 1922, the Harding ad-
ministration, through its Attorney General Harry M. Daugh-
205. [T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get it-
self accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
206. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
208. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
209. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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erty, sought a massive injunction to break a railway workers'
strike210 that tied up the nation's rail system. When the federal
judge granted the injunction, conservatives applauded, but lib-
erals cried out against it. The injunction forbade union officials
from aiding the strike "by letters, telegrams, telephones, word
of mouth, or otherwise." 21' Picketing was prohibited, and union
officials were even restrained from issuing any strike direc-
tions, or saying or writing anything which might keep any
strikebreaker from working. The liberal New York World
called for the impeachment of both Daugherty and Judge Wil-
kerson, the man who issued the injunction.212 Other journalists
were quick to spot the implications of the action.213 "If the
spokesmen for the strikers can be enjoined from writing about
the strike or from talking about it for publication," wrote the
Brooklyn Eagle, "newspapers can also be enjoined from pub-
lishing interviews and statements which have any color
favorable to the strikers or adverse to the railroads."214 The in-
fluential trade journal, Editor and Publisher, was more categor-
icah 'The constitutional guarantees of a free press and free
citizenship... were taken away last Saturday when the First
Amendment of the Constitution was abridged by Federal In-
junction."215
In contrast, Daugherty insisted that the injunction was sal-
utary to free speech and press. It guarded the honest Ameri-
can worker from criminal action and, thereby, preserved the
worker's freedom and individuality. The only question was one
of maintaining public security under the Constitution. With
the forces of evil frustrated, Daugherty told a Canton, Ohio au-
dience, "God reigns and the government at Washington still
lives. 216
The Daugherty episode produced one revealing incident
having national implications. William Allen White, the famous
Kansas editor, was arrested during the period by state authori-
ties for supporting the strikers. The pro-strike placards he
210. For a full statement of the injunction order see Frankfurter & Landis,
Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Interior" Federal
Courts, 37 Hazv. L. Rsv. 1010, 1101-13 (1924).
211. Id. at 1107.
212. Impeachable Offenses, N.Y. World, September 7, 1922, at 10, col. 2.
213. See, e.g., Smothering a Strike by Injunction, LrrERAY DIG., Sept. 16,
1922, at 7.
214. Quoted in id. at 8.
215. Trifling With Freedom, EDrroR AND PUBLIsHER, Sept. 9, 1922, at 26.
216. Address by Harry M. Daugherty, Attorney General of the United
States, at Canton, Ohio (Oct. 21, 1922).
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placed in the windows of his newspaper office were promptly
declared to be a "form of picketing."2 17 But White refused to
remove them. Instead he wrote a Pulitzer Prize winning edito-
rial on the need for freedom of expression in periods of na-
tional crisis. 2 18 White was eventually freed and ultimately the
strike was broken. The message these events conveyed ap-
peared clear. Free speech and press advocacy, while eloquent,
was not persuasive to those in power. Rather, it was the poten-
tial of injunctive relief which was intriguing, particularly due to
its utility for the protection of property interests.
The message was clearly read. The following year in Cali-
fornia a state judge, Charles 0. Busick, issued an injunction,
subsequently upheld by the state supreme court, against the
various acts prohibited by the state's criminal syndicalism
law.2 19 Members of the IWW and the Worker's Party were thus
prohibited from circulating pamphlets and books, advocating
their doctrines, or organizing any group to do so. The Busick
injunction consequently removed offenders from the control of
juries and gave the judge the direct power to sentence them for
contempt of court for their actions. As a result, equity proceed-
ings tended to replace direct prosecutions under the act, thus
eliminating the growing embarrassment of using dubious wit-
nesses, a standard practice in the trials of radicals, and the
need to rely upon juries. Again, opponents promptly protested
against the use of this legal device to prohibit free speech and
press. But again, the successful use of this legal avenue sug-
gested to various conservative leaders the possibilities of ad-
ding injunctive relief to state police power as a method for
making that power quick, easily applicable, and effective with a
minimum of legal complications. Since the legislative record
does not indicate the motives of the sponsors of the Minnesota
statute, it is not possible to establish a direct connection be-
tween this legislation and the Minnesota Gag Law of 1925; how-
ever, certain similarities in the two laws are sufficiently clear to
suggest that the sponsors of the Minnesota legislation knew
about it.220
217. W. JOHNSON, WIIJAM ALLEN WHITE's AMERICA 364 (1947).
218. H. MAHI, THE EDITOR AND HIS PEOPLE: EDrroIuALs BY WILIAM ALLEN
WHIrE 346 (1924).
219. For the text of the injunction see In re Wood, 194 Cal. 49, 227 P. 908
(1924).
220. The continuing use of the injunction to stop what many considered to
be legitimate activities eventually led to a national anti-injunction campaign by
the American Civil Liberties Union, and to several proposed congressional
measures, ultimately succeeding with the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 (ch. 90,
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These developments again underlined the low priority
which courts in the 1920s placed upon the protection of free-
dom of expression for its own sake. The point was brought out
clearly Gitlow v. New York221--the first celebrated state press
case to reach the Supreme Court since Gilbert v. Minnesota.
2
New York authorities arrested Benjamin Gitlow during the
'"red scare" of 1920 for publishing the Left Wing Manifesto, a
pamphlet denouncing capitalism and advocating the establish-
ment of a socialist state. The case went through two appeals 2 3
during which lower court judges raised serious questions about
the punishment of mere expression and the failure to establish
a clear relationship between that expression and some illegal
act. When the New York Court of Appeals upheld the convic-
tion, Judge Cuthbert Pound, influenced by the views of
Learned Hand and Zechariah Chafee, questioned whether the
court adequately considered the utility of speech. In a dissent-
ing opinion joined by Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, he argued
that "the rights of the best men are secure only if the rights of
the vilest and most abhorrent are protected."2 2 4 Gitlow, an offi-
cial of the Communist Party, retained as counsel Walter H. Pol-
lak, the distinguished New York attorney, who over the next
ten years would emerge as one of the most effective civil liber-
ties lawyers to argue before the Supreme Court. Influenced
by Brandeis's dissent in the Gilbert case, Pollak attempted to
persuade the Supreme Court on appeal that the law should
strike down local controls over individual liberties when they
became excessively arbitrary. Liberty of expression, he argued,
is a right which the due process clause protects against state
47 Stat. 70). P. MURPHY, supra note 135, at 238. George Norris, a progressive
Senator from Nebraska, was active in every stage of the process. As his biogra-
pher points out,
Norris understood that in issuing an injunction, a judge not only made
law as expressed in the terms of the document, but also had responsi-
bility for its enforcement, thereby assuming both legislative and execu-
tive authority in addition to rendering judgment upon his own acts.
Injunction-made laws could send men to prison without jury trials. Vi-
olators would be tried before the man who had made the law they were
charged with disobeying.
R. Lowrrr & G. NoRms, THE PERSISTENCE OF A PROGRESSIVE, 1913-1933, at 438
(1971).
221. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
222. 254 U.S. 325 (1919). See notes 206-07 supra and accompanying text.
223. People v. Gitlow, 111 Misc. 641, 183 N.Y.S. 846 (1920), aff'd, 195 App. Div.
773, 187 N.Y.S. 783 aft'd, 234 N.Y. 132, 136 N.E. 317 (1922), aff'd, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
224. 234 N.Y. at 158.
225. Regarding Pollak, see Z. Chafee, Walter Heilprin Pollak, 22 DIcTIoNARY
OF AMERcAN BIOGRAPHY 534, 534-35 (1958).
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action. This is established by the Court's authoritative deter-
mination of the meaning of "liberty" as used in the fourteenth
amendment, by the assumptions it uses in dealing with the pre-
cise question, and by its explicit declarations with respect to
the related right of free assemblage.226 Pollak convinced the
Court on at least this point. The majority, speaking through
Justice Sanford, made it clear that "we may and do assume
that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected
by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the states. '227 Thus, as one commentator indi-
cated, Sanford "opened the door upon what was to become a
new era in the constitutional law of civil liberty."228 On the
other hand, the Court refused to use such a device in this case,
sustaining Gitlow's conviction and refusing to strike down New
York's criminal anarchy law which secured the conviction.
Sanford also refused to accept the clear and present danger
test as a way of dealing with speech and press issues at the
state level. That rule, he argued, was intended to apply only to
cases where the statute "merely prohibits certain acts involving
the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to lan-
guage itself."229 He held that the test did not apply to a statute
expressly directed against words of incitement. Words could
be punished for their bad nature, he insisted, by an interpreta-
tion of their meaning regardless of the effectiveness of their im-
pact. If legislative findings resulted in statutes aimed clearly at
curtailing the dissemination of sentiments destructive to the
ends of society, that was sufficient regardless of the Court's
opinion that there was no danger of bad acts. It is not surpris-
ing that Holmes wrote a scorching dissent. Happily agreeing
that the term "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment included
speech and press, he deplored the majority's reluctance to ap-
ply the clear and present danger doctrine to Gitlow's pamphlet
and their suggestion that words could be punished for their
possible tendency to incite violence. He argued:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it
is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of en-
ergy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the
226. Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 11, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
On Pollak's strategy see Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 73 (1954).
227. 268 U.S. at 666.
228. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 139, at 664.
229. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925).
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expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is
the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to rea-
son. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before
us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration.
2 3 0
Brandeis also was pleased with the acceptance of the "in-
corporation" doctrine and joined Holmes in his dissent. He was
determined, however, to push both the incorporation principle
and the marketplace concept into full majority acceptance. In a
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,231 he proposed an
explicit way of determining when state curtailment of expres-
sion might be warranted. He wrote:
No danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, un-
less the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
and not enforced silence.
2
Thus, even in affording more precise ways to limit freedom of
speech, Brandeis was at pains to make clear that state restric-
tions were warranted only when general social needs were
threatened by a type of expression that might lead directly to
serious damage to society.
Brandeis's concern, however, was not merely that of find-
ing a salutary method for delineating the boundary of state reg-
ulatory authority. With Holmes, he criticized the unfortunate
impact on the law of a double standard in constitutionally pro-
tected freedoms. In legislation regulating labor contracts, free-
dom was the rule and regulation the exception. Brandeis asked
why the same principle did not apply to limitations on speech
and press. The state was assuming responsibility for curtailing
the freedom of individuals, expressing themselves either orally
or in print, to challenge actions potentially dangerous to prop-
erty and, hence, to society. Why should the state be curtailed
in its power to regulate a variety of anti-social activities in the
economic area, which in the long run robbed people of their in-
dividualism and created the conditions which initially fostered
dissent and protest? These persuasive convictions, wrapped as
230. Id. at 673.
231. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 377. Although the Court upheld the conviction of Ms. Whitney,
the Governor of California shortly thereafter pardoned her. In the interim the
Court took another California criminal syndicalism case, Burns v. United
States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927). In Burns, Justice Pierce Butler upheld the convic-
tion of an IWW organizer, despite an eloquent brief by Walter Pollak and a
sharp dissent by Justice Brandeis. Both argued that the law's only concern
was to protect property, with no sensitivity to any other personal interests or
rights.
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they were with a strong element of social responsibility and a
serious concern for the needs of society, advanced the liberta-
rian position on free speech and press in the latter years of the
1920s. The liberal community embraced this position more and
more, especially as the nation began to feel the effects of the
1929 depression. In early 1931 under the new Chief Justice,
Charles Evans Hughes,233 who was far more sensitive to civil
liberties than his predecessors, the Court moved to pull away
from the traditional property-oriented definition of liberty in
the economic area, and to sanction state police power as a legit-
imate device for protecting the public against business ex-
ploitation, even in cases where the Constitution would
normally have denied its use as an unwarranted interference
with liberty of contract.234 The ruling in O'Gorman v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co., a five to four decision issued only a few
months before the Near case, made the outcome of Near im-
portant to first amendment doctrine. It was important not only
for first amendment freedoms and their new protection from
the states, but also for state economic regulatory laws, possibly
subject to new judicial sanction if liberty lost its previously
property-oriented meaning.
In addition to the Court, other elements in the 1920s were
deeply concerned over free press issues and involved them-
selves actively to achieve their favorable resolution. For exam-
ple, the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA),
founded in 1887 as a daily newspaper trade association, worked
to free the press. By the 1920s, the ANPA represented the
great majority of American newspapers, serving principally as
233. Hughes spoke out strongly during the "red scare" days of 1920 against
refusal of the New York legislature to seat duly elected Socialist representa-
tives and headed a delegation of lawyers to Albany that decried such a prosti-
tution of the democratic process. M. PUSEY, CHAnrEs Ev~As HUGHES 391
(1951).
234. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58
(1931). Harry Shulman quickly noticed the implications of the shift which was
occurring:
Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think, is the vehicle
to more general liberty; its complete exercise by some does not in-
fringe upon the like liberty of others, whatever other evils it may
abuse. But freedom to contract as you will and impose whatever condi-
tions you can may be a sure means of oppression; its complete exercise
by some often results in the curtailment of the like freedom of others.
A larger capacity for liberty to contract in our economic organization
may well need governmental control of the power to exert economic
compulsion. But a larger capacity for the liberty of speech needs pri-
marily absence of governmental restraint on speech.
Shulman, The Supreme Court's Attitude toward Liberty of Contract and Free-
dom of Speech, 41 YALE L. J. 262, 271 (1931).
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an instrument for advancing the business interests of daily
newspapers and as a negotiator of adjustments and conflicts
with advertisers, labor, communications competitors, newsprint
makers, and the government. In the immediate post World War
I period, the organization expressed strong concern over con-
tinuing government interference with the media and took the
position that the nation no longer needed the wartime rules,
regulations, and frequent coercion, and that deregulation and
decriminalization were required. In 1923, the body set up a
committee on federal laws, which it directed to "exercise its ut-
most effort to maintain the freedom of the press whenever and
wherever it may be threatened."235
The ANPA based part of its concern on a fear that if sizable
portions of the American public came to regard the press as
solely a business enterprise, it would be open to economic reg-
ulation under the authority of state police power. On the other
hand, it feared the press would lose public sympathy for its
freedom as an information source protected by the first amend-
ment. Thus, the ANPA, sensitive to rising public criticism of
the press's behavior and to the press's sins not only of commis-
sion, but also of omission, particularly in its highly partisan
treatment of many political issues, found itself more on the de-
fensive than usual.23 6
One of the movers and shakers in the ANPA was Colonel
Robert R. McCormick, the colorful, autocratic owner and pub-
lisher of the Chicago Tribune. McCormick, long concerned
with keeping the politicians off the back of the media, in fact
opened the decade defending a long and colorful libel action
against the city of Chicago. The city sued the Tribune for the
sum of ten million dollars for alleged libel, because the newspa-
per criticized the fiscal administration of the city and, thereby,
injured its credit.23 7 The Tribune rested its defense on the ar-
gument that the state and federal constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press precluded a government's suit for libel.
235. E. EMERY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIA-
TiON 221 (1950).
236. Questions were raised regarding why the ANPA did not do a better job
of policing its own members in the 1920s. The ANPA's response was that as a
trade association with voluntary membership, it had no real authority to police
any newspaper's content, orientation, or management. E. EMERY, supra note
235, at 221-22. Some contemporaries, however, remained unpersuaded, believ-
ing that if the ANPA were to claim full press freedom, it had an obligation to do
a better job of policing itself. See generally S. BENT, supra note 177, at 268.
237. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 596-98, 139 N.E. 86, 86-87
(1923).
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McCormick won. The Chief Justice of Illinois handed down a
unanimous decision, vigorously asserting the right of the media
to inform the public regarding the performance of its officials:
"When the people became sovereign, as they did when our gov-
ernment was established under our constitution and the minis-
ters became the servants of the people, the right to discuss
government followed as a natural sequence."238 McCormick's
efforts soon realized even greater rewards.
IX. THE NEAR LITIGATION DRAWS
NATIONAL ATITENTION
In 1928, partly in response to the first prosecution under
the Minnesota Gag Law earlier that year, McCormick accepted
the chairmanship of a new ANPA Committee on Freedom of
the Press.239 Not surprisingly, as the first Gag Law case under
the Minnesota statute began to work its way through the Min-
nesota courts, the ANPA and McCormick quickly lent support
to the defendant Minneapolis publishers, by furnishing
financial assistance and legal counsel. McCormick saw the law
as authority for a repeat performance, this time through an in-
junction proceeding, of the political assault he had overcome in
Chicago five years earlier. At the 1929 ANPA meeting, he sub-
mitted a committee report decrying the statute as "tyrannical,
despotic, un-American and oppressive," as resuscitating "obso-
lete libels on the government" and "permitting suppression of
publications exposing corruption in government." 240 The report
asserted that courts of equity should not be permitted to cen-
sor the press and suppress writings in advance of publication,
and that "this statute was the first attempt of a legislature since
the foundation of the Union to gag the press in so drastic a
manner."241 At its 1930 meeting, the ANPA adopted another
resolution condemning the Minnesota act as "a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States, a peril to the right of property and a menace to
republican institutions.., and as a dangerous and vicious in-
238. Id. at 601, 139 N.E. at 88.
239. At the time the Committee was appointed, it adopted a resolution stat-
ing that "Te action of the Minnesota Legislature and Courts, if permitted to
stand, will render all guarantees of free speech valueless in Minnesota, and
such choking of thought and expression can be extended further if not
checked." The resolution is printed in P. KiNSLEY, LIBERTY AND THE PREss 35-
36 (1944).
240. Quoted in Foster, The 1931 Personal Liberty Cases, 9 N.Y.UJ.Q. REV.
64, 68 n.16 (1931).
241. Id.
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vasion of personal liberties."242
ANPA members were particularly troubled by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court ruling in the initial Gag Law case sus-
taining the use of the Gag Law. The court reasoned that the
current tendency in American law was to extend, rather than to
restrict, the police power; accordingly, the legislature could le-
gitimately place certain conditions on the way a person con-
ducts a business. Since the newspaper business was no*
different than any other business, and the distribution of scan-
dalous material disturbed the public peace, provoked assaults
and the commission of crimes, and was therefore detrimental
to public morals and to the general welfare, the law was valid.
The case, the court noted, was not unlike a number of other re-
cent precedents in which the states legitimately restrained the
press. Moreover, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment was never intended to limit the subjects on which
the police power of the states might be lawfully exerted. 43 If
this position were to be sustained on appeal, the free press,
which the body was pledged to defend, would clearly be endan-
gered.244 Editorials and general expression of pained protest
from the national press underlined this concern.245
242. N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1930, at 4, col 2.
243. State ex rel Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 465, 219 N.W. 770, 773
(1928).
244. In the initial Minnesota case, State ex rel Olson v. Guilford, attorneys
for the Saturday Press argued that closing down the publication violated the
state constitution's free press provisions, and that the use of an equity proceed-
ing denying jury trial violated constitudonal rights. Chief Justice Wilson re-
jected these charges. "[T]he police power," he contended, "includes all
regulations designed to promote public convenience, happiness, general wel-
fare and prosperity, an orderly state of society, the comfort of the people, and
peace, and ... it extends to all great public needs as well as to regulations
designed to promote public health, morals or safety." He equated the Saturday
Press, as a nuisance, to lotteries, noxious weeds, houses of prostitution, dogs,
itinerant carnivals, saloons, and malicious fences. 174 Minn. at 459, 219 N.W. at
771. In the appeal from this ruling, attorneys for the paper added a property
charge, contending the injunctive action deprived Near of his right to earn a liv-
ing, and thereby sought to capitalize upon the court's presumed concern with
property and the individual's economic rights. Again the supreme court re-
jected their argument, insisting that to run a business one must operate it in
harmony with the public welfare, something Near deliberately refused to do.
179 Minn. 40, 41, 228 N.W. 326, 326 (1929).
245. The Cleveland Plain Dealer stated after the initial ruling- "Thbe case is
one of vast importance. It far overshadows the specific wrong committed
against an obscure and unimportant weekly publication in Minnesota. It con-
cerns the fundamental rights of free speech and free press." December 8, 1928,
at 7. The New York Times, after the unsuccessful Minnesota appeal, wrote that
the Gag Law was a "vicious law." N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1929, at 24, col. 3. Mean-
while, the Chicago TWbune charged that Minnesota may justly claim to be the
more ridiculous of the "Monkey States."
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The Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of Near v.
Minnesota on January 30, 1931, handing down its ruling on
June 1 of that year. Between those two dates it heard a case246
challenging the use of a California Red Flag law to silence the
leaders of a left-wing summer camp, and ruled large portions of
that law a deprivation of liberty without due process, contrary
to the fourteenth amendment.247
Attorneys for Near argued the civil libertarian position es-
poused by Hand, Chafee, Holmes, and Brandeis, insisting that
the Minnesota statutory restraints, exercisable prior to publica-
tion, were incompatible with freedom of the press. To sup-
press a newspaper as a nuisance or otherwise was a form of
prior restraint. Moving to more practical considerations, the
appellant's brief argued that state punishment of utterances,
not as criminal libels on individuals, but as general injuries to
the public welfare, abridged freedom of the press, unless the
statements advocated the violent overthrow of the government
or a breach of the law. Freedom of the press, it contended, was
protected by the fourteenth amendment, and the Gag Law de-
prived the appellant of this liberty without due process of law.
Apparently seeking further bolstering, the brief argued that the
Gag Law abridgment of freedom of the press also violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Clearly the attorneys again sought to use a more traditional ar-
gument by insisting that the right to publish was a "common
occupation of life," both a property right and a liberty within
the protection of the fourteenth amendment.249
Attorneys for the State of Minnesota, with much more re-
strictive precedents to rely upon, submitted a six-part argu-
ment. Admitting that "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment
included freedom of the press, they contended that the term
did not allow an unrestricted right to publish everything. Hark-
ing back to the Bucks Stove 250 case, they asserted that the
After all it is less than one hundred years since intelligent men dis-
carded the traditional biological notions found in the Bible. It is nearly
three hundred years since John Milton stated the argument for free
speech and free press, . . . [and] Milton was by no means the first
champion of enlightenment in this field.
Chicago Daily Tribune, Mar. 28, 1929, at 14, col 2.
246. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
247.- See P. Mum'HY, supra note 135, at 245-46. This constituted the first case
in which the Court actually ruled portions of a state law unconstitutional as a
violation of the first amendment applied through the fourteenth.
248. Brief for Appellant at 22-23, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
249. Id. at 52-54.
250. Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205 (1912).
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courts have power to restrain by injunction the publication of
defamatory matters; the Minnesota statute did not adversely
affect property rights, since its application was not intended to
prevent anyone from engaging in a lawful calling. Further, they
argued that the power of a state legislature to forbid an inno-
cent occupation because certain evils existed incident to the oc-
cupation was often sustained against attack under the taking of
property language in the due process clause, that newspapers
publishing scandalous material were in some states declared to
be criminal publications, and that the evil which the Act sought
to suppress was a nuisance in fact.251
Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Holmes, Brandeis, Stone,
and Roberts, clearly embraced the liberal position. He stated
early on that "in the present case, we have no occasion to in-
quire as to the permissible scope of subsequent punish-
ment."2 5 2 The subject was the "no prior restraint" doctrine and
its protection of the publication of material which could well be
the subject of subsequent punishment under criminal libel or
other laws. Hughes's argument concerning prior restraint was
far more historical than analytical. As Thomas Emerson
pointed out, "the Court never undertook to explain the func-
tional basis of the prior restraint doctrine. '253 It preferred to
find in the "general conception" of liberty of the press, as
adopted by the Federal Constitution, the essential attribute of
freedom from prior restraint, which the Court was convinced
the statute violated. On the other hand, possibly reflecting the
emerging legal realism of the day, Hughes did not care to be
drawn into the abstract question of whether the Minnesota law
authorized prior restraint. Rather, he believed the test was
whether in operation the law worked that way-whether in its
administration and techniques of enforcement, it served to pre-
clude in advance the dispersal of certain ideas and informa-
251. Brief for Appellee at 10, 16, 25, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
During the oral argument, James E. Markham, the Assistant Attorney General
of Minnesota, contended that the statute was not a restraint prior to publica-
tion, quoting Holmes's dictum in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen.,
205 U.S. 454 (1907) that prior restraints were alone within the prohibition of the
free press concept. Holmes smilingly interrupted him and said: "I was much
younger when I wrote that opinion than I am now. If I did make such a hold-
ing, I now have a different view." Quoted in &. McCoRMIcK, THE FREEDOM OF
THE PAEss 51 (1936). Brandeis at one point stated to counsel, "It is difficult to
see how one can have a free press, and the protection it affords a democratic
community, without the privilege this act seeks to limit." N.Y. Times, Jan. 31,
1931, at 6, coL 7.
252. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 715.
253. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN 506 (1970).
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tion.254 Proceeding from these assumptions, Hughes ruled that
the Minnesota law was an unconstitutional infringement of the
freedom of the press safeguarded by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In the process, he asserted finally,
after 150 years, the principle that restraint before publication is,
with few exceptions, unconstitutional. In finally reducing the
broad prohibition against prior restraint to a working principle
of constitutional law, he recognized that minor exceptions ex-
isted.255 Contemporary commentators, however, viewed the ex-
ceptions as insignificant and hypothetical. The broader
implications of the majority, speaking through the Chief Jus-
tice, gave the decision its historical significance as a turning
point in American law and public policy.
The ruling brought to a significant new stage Brandeis's
long crusade for redefining the term "liberty" in human rights
rather than in property rights terms.2 6 By actually using that
concept to strike down a state law, the decision also logically
extended the incorporation theory as it related to freedom of
the press, a theory which Justice Sanford launched in his Git-
low opinion.257 Considered with the O'Gorman decision of the
previous January 5, which downgraded the property rights ob-
jection to states' use of police power, Near seemed to shift pre-
sumptions regarding the constitutionality of state laws. Laws
restricting personal liberties now demanded new and vigorous
justification, while laws restricting property rights were to be
given the judicial benefit of the doubt.258 Thus, the ruling
254. 283 U.S. at 708. Actually, there was much to be said for the minority
position that the situation was not formally a prior restraint situation, but a
system of subsequent punishment by contempt procedures. Thus, Hughes's
concern with testing the statute by its operation and effect was clear.
255. The four suggested exceptions were: publication of critical war infor-
mation; obscenity; publication inciting acts of violence against the community
or violent overthrow of the government; and publications invading private
rights. Id. at 716.
256. See Hamilton, The Jurist's Art, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 182-83 (F.
Frankfurter ed. 1932).
257. See text accompanying notes 226-28 supra.
258. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
Contemporary observers were well aware, however, of the limits of protection
the judiciary could actually give such rights. One commentator pointed out:
Review by the Supreme Court, even if the members were of one mind,
is a weak safeguard of personal liberty. It can review only a very small
fraction of the cases litigated. For the most part, this liberty is at the
mercy of executive and administrative officers and trial courts. But
while personal liberty must thus look for protection to our generally
becoming 'more civilized,' the Supreme Court can set a brilliant exam-
ple.
Shulman, supra note 234, at 270.
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culminated more than 60 years of struggle over the proper rela-
tionship among the federal government, the states, and the citi-
zen regarding first amendment issues. The press now joined
speech in being protected not only from formal federal govern-
ment restraint, but from state restraint and more subtle forms
of local restraint such as those authorized by the Minnesota
law. 259
In the first amendment area, the ruling was a clear triumph
for Learned Hand and Zechariah Chafee; Hughes even cited
Chafee's influential book Freedom of Speech in his opinion.2 60
The ruling was clearly "market-place" in its orientation. It
strongly stressed the importance in a democratic society of the
press being free to carry out its proper function of informing
the electorate, particularly about the behavior of the people's
public officials. The behavior of the editors of the Saturday
Press obviously troubled the Chief Justice-the form of expose,
writing they engaged in clearly was styled to arouse passion
rather than to disperse knowledge and information. The opin-
ion, however, in some ways blurred this distinction, focusing in-
stead upon the importance of editors to be able to criticize
public officials, consequently downplaying any illicit motives,
defamation, racial and religious bigotry, and general irresponsi-
bility. Hughes focused upon what was defensible about Near's
operation, rather than what was indefensible.
In this regard, the opinion came directly to terms with the
changing and modernizing conditions that produced much of
the new journalism. Arguing, with good historicial justification,
that journalistic abuse of American institutions and the people
who ran them characterized the early period in which our insti-
tutions took shape, Hughes pointed out that:
[T]he administration of government has become more complex, the op-
portunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has
grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by
unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the fundamental security
of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, empha-
sizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in
great cities. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by
miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary
the immunity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with offi-
cial misconduct.261
In a different context, the ruling represented an important
development in the area of deregulation and decriminalization,
259. See note 3 supra.
260. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
261. Id. at 719-720.
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an issue of considerable concern at this time. The World War I
and immediate postwar federal and state legislation attaching
criminal penalties to certain forms of expression, belief, and as-
sociation was a form of public regulation. Not unlike the prohi-
bition amendment, its critics increasingly viewed it as
unwarranted interference with personal rights and personal
choices, which many people believed did not deserve to be clas-
sified with criminal behavior.262 The Near decision, along with
the Stromberg ruling two weeks earlier, was actually a form of
decontrol striking at the use of state police power to curtail
freedom of expression. Decontrol was not only popular at the
time, but indicated the general public's distaste for the heavy
handed enforcement of sedition, criminal syndicalism, and red
flag laws, as well as for state and local censorship of various
forms of publication.263 In this regard, the majority opinion was
in sharp contrast to that of both Minnesota Supreme Court rul-
ings and of the minority dissent, all of which supported and en-
couraged a greater use of state police power to deal with
virtually every unseemly aspect of society and human behav-
ior.
The majority opinion also questioned and rejected some of
the assumptions and overtones of the earlier word crime laws.
Suspicion emerged regarding whether they were really precau-
tionary laws designed not as punishment for actual wrong con-
duct, but as a means to prevent future evils by a series of
restrictions and qualifications which local officials could use to
control conduct which the majority found somehow unaccept-
able.26 4 The Supreme Court in Near deplored the action of
Minnesota's Attorney General, Floyd B. Olson, in using the dis-
cretion which the Gag Law afforded him as a way of sup-
pressing critics of corrupt politicians. The majority Justices
262. See generally D. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 116-18
(1979).
263. The opinion does make an exception for obscenity, but does not define
it: "[T]he primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications." 283 U.S. at 716. But the Court did begin moving toward more
precise definitions shortly thereafter, with Judge Woolsey in the 1933 case of
United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses" 5 F. Supp. 182 (D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd,
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), attacking the older Comstock rule and thereby under-
mining sharply the discretionary authority of customs officials to exclude works
they found offensive. This constituted a further form of decriminalization as
well as a modification of a form of prior restraint.
264. Congress apparently was not sufficiently influenced to respond accord-
ingly and in 1932 passed an extortion law, making it a crime to use the mails to
injure innocent parties. Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 464, 47 Stat. 649 (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 876, 877, 3239 (1976)). For a discussion of the passage of the meas-
ure, see Fowler, supra note 164; at 132-33.
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said that Olson's action was typical of the way preventive or
precautionary legislation was used, and they deplored the li-
cense it gave to enforcement officials. 265 Nine months after the
Near decision, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act,266
which legally restricted the use of the labor injunction as a de-
vice for limiting freedom of speech, press, and assembly. The
Near ruling complimented and possibly played a role in precip-
itating this further attack upon the use of certain types of con-
trols that were designed to afford local officials authorization to
use a type of power which otherwise would have been legally
beyond their reach.
Finally, the Near case, along with Stromberg v. Califor-
nia,267 was an attempt to move away, and move the country
away, from the use of informal local controls to limit freedom of
expression. Just as the majority condemned the ongoing use of
the police power to restrict civil liberties, so it condemned a sit-
uation which made it possible for local officials, often acting at
the behest of private local power, to selectively use their discre-
tion in the law enforcement process to curtail expression that
was distasteful or threatening to the local power establishment.
While the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s quickly
demonstrated that such controls could be swiftly revived and
reinvigorated, the realistic recognition of their potential as de-
vices to inhibit free expression by the Near court marked an
265. As Thomas L Emerson pointed out, such a proscription was not perma-
nent. Much of the McCarthy era's legislation was of the same kind, constitut-
ing "a tremendous and ominous expansion of preventive law in the area of civil
liberties." Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CoNTEiP. PROB.
648, 649 (1955).
266. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976)). The
key section of the Act read.
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case in-
volving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute from doing.., any
of the following acts:
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, or patrolling, or
any other method not accompanied by force or violence;
(f) Assemblying peaceably... in promotion of their interest in a
labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of
the acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified, and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified.
Id. at § 4.
267. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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important judicial acknowledgement of a process long over-
looked by legal literalists.
Justice Pierce Butler, a Minnesotan, wrote a strong dissent-
ing opinion joined by Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter. Butler began his dissent with the annoyed ac-
knowledgement that "[t]he decision of the Court in this case
declares Minnesota and every other State powerless to restrain
by injunction the business of publishing and circulating among
the people malicious, scandalous and defamatory periodicals
that in due course of judicial procedure has been adjudged to
be a public nuisance."268 Butler stated that such a ruling "gives
to freedom of the press a meaning and a scope not heretofore
recognized and construes 'liberty' in the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to put upon the States a federal re-
striction that is without precedent."269 Clearly interested in
protecting Minnesota's respectable citizens from the possibility
of abuse, he based most of his dissent upon the facts of the par-
ticular case, pointing out that Near did precisely what the law
was intended to prevent, and that Near was, by his own admis-
sion, tainted with blackmail. He also quoted at length from the
alleged malicious articles appearing in the Saturday Press.270
A considerable portion of his analysis questioned whether
the Minnesota law actually constituted prior restraint in the
historical sense of that term. He denied sharply that it did,
quoting the petitioner: "'every person had a constitutional
right to publish malicious, scandalous and defamatory material
though untrue and with bad motives and for unjustifiable ends
in thefirst instance, though he is subject to responsibility ther-
efore afterwards." 271 The latter, once it was established by
reading the published writing, was perfectly susceptible to con-
trol through the exertion of the state's police power, a power
which the Justice viewed as being broad authority to prohibit a
full range of questionable activities. The use of this type of po-
lice power was essential for practical reasons. Subsequent
punishment, he argued, was inadequate to protect against the
sort of evil confronted here, since legislative libel laws were
"inadequate effectively to suppress evils resulting from the
kind of business and publications that are shown in this
case."2 72 Thus, Butler, whose previous position had generally
268. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 724-27 (Butler, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 730 (Butler, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 737 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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been that "a state may not, under the guise of protecting the
public, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or prohibit
lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary
restrictions upon them",2 73 now took the position that protec-
tion of legitimate businesses from this kind of illegitimate be-
havior justified new levels of control. Although Near's business
had not been regulated, but closed down totally, Butler did not
see this as any threat to property rights, despite the argument
of Near's attorneys to the contrary. Since he was threatening
the morals, peace, and good order of the state, Near's behavior
was a nuisance. Any way that such a nuisance could be legally
suppressed appeared to be condonable in the Justice's eyes. 274
Butler also seemed totally insensitive to the "liberty" issue
which the case raised. As J. Edward Gerald pointed out, Butler
and those who joined him
seemed oblivious of the unconstitutional nature of prior restraint and
assumed that a state court operating by summary procedure was freed
of the obligations of due process of law. Moreover, the dissenting jus-
tices would have left the states free of the compulsions of the First
Amendment, as if the amendment had been intended less to assure a
minimum standard of freedom to the people than to provide an exclu-
sive operations franchise for state legislatures bent on some degree of
suppression of freedom. 275
It seems reasonable to suppose that if Butler and the three
other dissenters had prevailed, Near would not have taken its
rather sharp departure from stare decisis. One may also specu-
late that an adverse Near precedent would have further
strengthened state police power and encouraged its extension
into other areas. 276 In time the Gag Law might have been
273. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924).
274. Generally, until this time in order for the state police power regulation
to be upheld by the courts, it had to bear close relation to the evils it was in-
tended to apprehend. The burden of the legislation had to fall equally on all
who were similarly situated, although this did not mean that the class to be
regulated could not be small and narrowly defined. Also, the language of the
law had to be clear and concise and plainly state the nature of the conduct sub-
jecting the citizen to penalty or punishment. All of these conditions were met
by the Near legislation, or seemed to be, so that a Justice like Butler could not
see any reason why this was not perfectly good law. See generally D. Belgum,
The Anatomy of State Police Power, 1900-1933 (Dec. 1972) (Ph. D. dissertation,
University of Minnesota).
275. J. GERALD, THE PREss AND THE CoNsTtrr oN, 1931-1947, at 129 (1948)
(footnote omitted).
276. Zechariah Chafee later pointed out that unlike the rapid spread of
criminal syndicalism and sedition acts, there initially had been no imitation of
the Gag Law in other states, but since "authorities are constantly subject to the
temptation of imposing some kind of rigid control on objectionable criti-
cism. ... [,] probably it would soon have been copied elsewhere except for
this decision." Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNIrrED STATES 381 (1941).
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widely copied in other states and used to enjoin speech in
other areas of communication such as broadcasting, motion pic-
tures, radio, and possibly television.
An adverse Near precedent could also have been used not
only to suppress the scandal sheet business, but also to con-
demn a variety of other businesses as nuisances, all without a
trial, a jury, and due process. This might have turned police
power into a tool which authorities could have used for parti-
san political purposes, particularly when the media became too
ambitious and candid in revealing the seamy underside of
much of modern political behavior.
The contemporaneous popular and scholarly reaction to
the Near ruling reflected many of these concerns and addition-
ally demonstrated a remarkable perceptiveness about the
Court's ruling and its implications. In summarizing broad jour-
nalistic reaction to the decision shortly after it was issued, the
Literary Digest quoted a newspaper account which commented
that the shift of a majority of the Court to the "liberal" side was
'[jiust about the biggest Washington news of the decade .... The
cleavage between liberal and conservative and the dominance of the
former appear particularly in two areas of decisions. One, speaking
broadly, emphasizes human rights and constitutional guarantees to the
individual, such as freedom of speech. These human rights the liberals
of the Court tend to protect or enlarge.
The other group of decisions ... tends to restrain private property
rights and to enlarge the powers of State government in dealing with
private property.'277
The Minneapolis Tribune, on the other hand, was unimpressed.
In its editorial, the writer stated:
The jubilation over the decision of the supreme court will be much
more enthusiastic outside of Minnesota. For some unexplained reason
this state seems to have been particularly fertile in the production of
blackmailing and scandal sheets. The suppression law put an end to
them, but no doubt they will be back with us, now that the law has
been declared unconstitutional. 278
Joseph P. Pollard, writing in the popular journal, The Fo-
rum, was particularly astute in his observation that
[t]he collapse of our economic structure and the present widespread
depression show that business enterprise free from governmental con-
trol will not work, and the new judges know it. Nor will suppression of
free thought achieve anything worthwhile in an enlightened era. This
too the judges have realized.., and... [they] have acted broadly,
tolerantly, and humanely. Much has been accomplished in the single
277. The Supreme Court's Shift to Liberalism, LrrERAE Y DIG., June 13, 1931,
at 8. See D. Wolf, Supreme Court in a New Phase, 34 CuRNr HIST., 590, 592-93
(1931).
278. Minneapolis Tribune, June 2, 1931, at 10, coL 1.
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year in which they have been together on the bench. Much more will
be accomplished in the years to come, and the Supreme Court will play
a part of ever-increasing prominence in the progressive development of
the country. 2
7 9
To the extent that the Near ruling marked one of the first fal-
tering ventures down this new road, its historical significance is
assured.
279. Pollard, supra note 190, at 199.
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